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In the conventional telling, environmentalism’s modern history be-
gins at spring.  It is silent.  Or, at least, it would be silent, if only the 
destructive din of postwar industrialism would subside long enough to 
reveal the stillness of a vacant, dying natural landscape.  A lone female 
voice manages to pierce through this din, seizing the American con-
sciousness with careful but passionate prose, documenting our toxico-
logical sins and imploring us to return to the holistic, ecological world-
view that once animated our moods and moves.  The unregulated 
market is an unhealthy system, the voice tells us, since it fails to attend 
to the long-term consequences of its constantly escalating patterns of 
production, consumption, and dispossession, its presentist, materialist, 
and individualist biases.  As her message begins to reach deeply into 
our culture, this writer of science and poetry finds herself attacked by 
unscrupulous defenders of the unsustainable status quo, who challenge 
her expertise and cast aspersions on her character in an organized 
campaign of suppression, disinformation, and manipulation.  But to no 
avail: the public has awakened to the truth about its chemical legacy.  
Now, it is only a matter of time before the crafters of law will respond, 
bringing us back from a precipice of irreversible environmental loss. 
In reverential tones, environmentalists tell this story — of Rachel 
Carson and her book, Silent Spring1 — as a reminder of how the 
movement’s modern successes began.  What would it mean for this 
cherished narrative, however, if the “Rachel Carson Paradigm”2 had 
emerged from a book that was not actually heartfelt in its plea for en-
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2042 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:2041  
vironmental awakening?  What if instead the book were a carefully 
constructed “framing” of environmental policy goals, one whose con-
tent emerged not from the thoughts and beliefs of a trained marine bi-
ologist turned nature writer, but from the research and advice of psy-
cholinguists, neuroscientists, social psychologists, and other consulting 
experts who had been retained to determine how best to “sell” national 
pesticide policy reform?  Would Silent Spring carry the same enduring 
resonance for environmentalists if they knew that its theme of opposi-
tion to unchecked industrialization, its emphasis on humanity’s detri-
mental impacts in the natural world, and its repositioning of conserva-
tionist thought for modern readers had been meticulously focus group–
tested in advance of publication, evaluated for subconscious affective 
impact through brain imaging, and double-checked for “fit” within 
various metaphorical structures that are believed to shape cognition, 
language, and, by extension, politics? 
Strategic marketing, of course, is nothing new.  In fact, Silent 
Spring was quite self-consciously positioned by Carson and her pub-
lisher, Houghton Mifflin, to maximize its political impact.3  Fixation 
on the interaction of marketing and politics seems to have reached a 
new level recently, however, with the national Democratic Party in 
particular interviewing all manner of wonkish academics, from cogni-
tive linguist Professor George Lakoff4 to psychologist Professor Drew 
Westen,5 in an effort to match the behind-the-curtains omnipotence 
that they attribute to Frank Luntz, the infamous Republican spin doc-
tor who rebranded the estate tax a “death tax” and, in consequence, 
seems to have forever altered perceptions of how American politics 
functions.  The latest entrants to this carnival of consultants are Ted 
Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, authors of Break Through: From 
the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility and self-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 For instance, Houghton Mifflin shrewdly promoted Silent Spring through serialization in 
the New Yorker, through advance distribution to key politicians, conservationists, and opinion 
leaders, and through widely promoted television appearances by the author on CBS Reports and 
The Tonight Show.  Carson, for her part, recruited prominent authors, journalists, and other fig-
ures to support her awareness crusade, including Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who 
touted Silent Spring in a pamphlet accompanying the work’s Book-of-the-Month club printing.  
See LINDA LEAR, RACHEL CARSON: WITNESS FOR NATURE 396–427 (1997). 
 4 Examples of his work include: GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: 
KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE — THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PRO-
GRESSIVES (2004); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES KNOW 
THAT LIBERALS DON’T (1996); GEORGE LAKOFF, WHOSE FREEDOM?  THE BATTLE OVER 
AMERICA’S MOST IMPORTANT IDEA (2006); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, META-
PHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); GEORGE LAKOFF & ROCKRIDGE INST., THINKING POINTS: 
COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND VISION (2006). 
 5 See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING 
THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007), purporting to be “of particular interest to the 50 million De-
mocratic voters who can’t figure out why their party has lost so many elections.”  Id. at 1.    
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described “research, policy, and strategy consultants to environmental 
and progressive foundations and organizations” (pp. 278–79 n.9).  
Nordhaus and Shellenberger first achieved notoriety by releasing an 
essay in 2004 entitled The Death of Environmentalism, in which the 
authors brashly proclaimed that “modern environmentalism, with all 
of its unexamined assumptions, outdated concepts and exhausted 
strategies, must die so that something new can live.”6  As the publisher 
of Break Through — again, Houghton Mifflin — proudly notes in the 
book’s publicity materials, Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s essay “trig-
gered a firestorm of controversy,”7 due in substantial part to the essay’s 
release at an “annual conference of environmental donors and grant-
ees” (p. 1).  This staged event enabled Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
later to be depicted as “the bad boys of American environmentalism” 
who upset the complacent mainstream of the movement by shouting 
with “the voice of the post-boomer generation.”8 
Again, marketing of this sort is nothing new.  What does appear 
novel about Break Through, though, is the degree to which market-
ing’s logic has invaded the product itself.  According to Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger, the future of environmentalism, and of American poli-
tics more broadly, lies not in stronger evidence, better science, or more 
reasoned appeals to the public, but instead in sheer marketing acumen, 
in forming and framing policy goals in a manner that activates the 
deeply embedded values and cognitive metaphors of the public.  To 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger, environmentalists currently suffer from a 
form of “policy literalism” that leads them, like liberals more generally, 
to vastly overstate the significance of science, empiricism, and means-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTAL-
ISM: GLOBAL WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 10 (2004), available 
at http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf.  Around the same 
time, former Sierra Club president Adam Werbach delivered a similar message in a speech to the 
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, in which he declared, “Environmentalism is dead in no 
small part because it could never match the right’s power to narrate a compelling vision of Amer-
ica’s future.”  Adam Werbach, Is Environmentalism Dead?: A Speech on Where the Movement 
Can and Should Go from Here, GRIST, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/01/ 
13/werbach-reprint. 
 7 Press Release, Houghton Mifflin Co., Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism 
to the Politics of Possibility (Oct. 4, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 8 Id. (quoting Bill McKibben, Bad Boys, Bad Boys, Whatcha Gonna Do, GRIST, Jan. 26, 
2005, http://www.grist.org/comments/dispatches/2005/01/25/mckibben/index1.html).  When laun-
ching Break Through, Houghton Mifflin carried this intergenerational conflict theme further, an-
nouncing that “[t]he publishers who brought you Walden [and] Silent Spring . . . now bring you a 
new politics for a new century,” and that “Break Through signals a radical break from the past 
and marks a generational changing of the guard.”  Id.  The authors themselves take up the theme 
in Break Through by invoking Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution and by casting 
themselves as the leading edge of a coming paradigm shift in environmental thought (pp. 108–11). 
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ends instrumental reasoning within American politics (p. 9).9  Against 
this rational positivism, which Nordhaus and Shellenberger regard as 
philosophically untenable (not to mention passé), the authors argue for 
a more visionary yet practical metaphysics, one in which science and 
other depictions of reality are assessed, not for their supposed truth-
value in corresponding to the world as it is, but rather for their quali-
ties of social usefulness.  Invoking the romantic pragmatism of Profes-
sor Richard Rorty, Nordhaus and Shellenberger contend that environ-
mentalists “must no longer put concepts like nature or ‘the 
environment’ at the center of [their] politics” (p. 17).  Instead, they 
must move “beyond environmentalism” (p. 17) to become culturally 
and linguistically savvy promoters of an actively imagined social fu-
ture, one that works to embody the values and enable the policies that 
environmentalists desire.10  Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that 
environmentalists will not succeed by emphasizing the rude facts 
about climate change, browbeating the public with the dire anticipated 
consequences of its profligacy.  Instead, environmentalists must delib-
erately frame the meaning of the global climate change issue in a 
manner that resonates, rather than reasons, with the public. 
In this respect, Nordhaus and Shellenberger fit comfortably beside 
Lakoff, who argues that “many progressives were brought up with the 
old 17th Century rationalist view of reason that implies that, if you 
just tell people the facts, they will reason to the right conclusion,”11 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 The authors are certainly not alone in their characterization of mainstream environmental-
ism as unduly technocratic and literalist.  Professor Zygmunt Plater, for instance, has argued that 
the environmental movement deserves a special place in the “circle of dumb” that accounts for the 
dismal record of environmentalism during the last three decades of American politics: “[O]ur most 
significant dumbness has been the naïve assumption that the merits of our positions — backed by 
science, rational logic over time, and a holistic overview that is a basic necessity in any complex 
society — would somehow inevitably find legs of their own.”  Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Dealing With 
Dumb and Dumber: The Continuing Mission of Citizen Environmentalism, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 9, 58 (2005); see also Richard O. Brooks, A New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law, 6 
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (1991) (criticizing environmental lawyers and bureaucrats for proposing 
unimaginative technical fixes aimed at symptoms rather than root causes of environmental prob-
lems); Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law, and Society: The Institutionalization of the En-
vironmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 109 (2001) (determining that the mainstreaming of 
environmentalism has resulted in a “steady state that resists significant changes in the institu-
tional status quo”); Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Rousing the Restless Majority: The Need for a Blue-
Green-Brown Alliance, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 5 (2004) (criticizing the environmental move-
ment for relying on litigation and lobbying, rather than grassroots activism and coalition-
building).  
 10 See also Werbach, supra note 6 (“The moment we free ourselves from this modern way of 
thinking by creating a new language, a new set of strategic initiatives, a new set of institutions, 
and a new metric for evaluating our success, we cease to be ‘environmentalists’ in any meaningful 
sense of the term and open ourselves up to the possibility of becoming progressive Americans.”). 
 11 George Lakoff, When Cognitive Science Enters Politics: A Response to Steven Pinker’s Re-
view of Whose Freedom? in The New Republic, http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/research/lakoff/ 
whencognitivescienceenterspolitics/view (last visited May 12, 2008). 
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and Westen, who contends that “[a]lthough the marketplace of ideas is 
a great place to shop for policies, the marketplace that matters most in 
American politics is the marketplace of emotions.”12  Unlike those left-
leaning commentators, however, Nordhaus and Shellenberger claim to 
have offered much more than just an effective means (for example, 
linguistic framing or emotional appeals) by which to achieve certain 
desired policy ends (for example, national health care or greater in-
come equality); instead, they claim to have offered a comprehensive 
account of, among other things, the status of scientific knowledge, the 
origin of value, and the nature of the human individual.  As a result of 
this ambitious course, the authors end up in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of having denied the very basis on which their preferred values 
and policies appear urgent.  That is, they trash the “antiquated” (p. 
141) ideas that science can reveal empirical truths about the world, 
that a natural realm can be identified free of human influence, that the 
realm so identified can have value or meaning other than that which 
occurs through sheer human construction, and that environmental be-
liefs and attitudes can flourish outside a context of pre-existing mate-
rial affluence and social stability.  All of this postmodernist trashing is 
undertaken in order to explain why environmentalists, in the authors’ 
view, have lost cultural and political relevance. 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s peculiar brand of postmodernism, 
however, is only marketing deep; it is almost-postmodernism.  It ac-
cepts the demise of Enlightenment conceptualizations and methodo-
logical convictions only insofar as that demise gives rise to better — 
that is, more fluid, empowering, and ultimately persuasive — appeals 
to the citizenry in furtherance of environmental policy goals.  The ba-
sic content and direction of those policy goals, however, somehow re-
main fixed throughout Break Through, even as the book purports to 
upend the very conceptual ground on which environmentalists have 
defined themselves and established their agenda.  “Image is nothing,” 
the makers of Sprite once told us with a wink; “framing is everything,” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 WESTEN, supra note 5, at 35–36.  The authors also sit comfortably beside academics who 
advanced similar arguments before Nordhaus and Shellenberger released their 2004 missive.  See, 
e.g., DALE JAMIESON, MORALITY’S PROGRESS: ESSAYS ON HUMANS, OTHER ANIMALS, 
AND THE REST OF NATURE 213–14 (2002) (“Environmentalists have all too often been trapped 
by their own rhetoric, and the movement as a whole has suffered from its use of misleading meta-
phors . . . .”); Michael Bruner & Max Oelschlaeger, Rhetoric, Environmentalism, and Environ-
mental Ethics, 16 ENVTL. ETHICS 377 (1994) (contending that with the right rhetoric, an ecocen-
tric value system could compete with mainstream utilitarianism); Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric 
and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (2000) 
(examining rhetorical strategies for reframing environmentalism goals); Eric T. Freyfogle, Five 
Paths of Environmental Scholarship, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 115 (describing and criticizing a mode 
of environmental law scholarship that sees the environment purely as an economic or technologi-
cal problem, rather than as a medium for the engagement of human imagination, hope, and  
values). 
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Nordhaus and Shellenberger now tell us with a similar glint.  Neither 
group of ironists has a way of evaluating its wares, other than how 
well they sell.  Taken for all they are worth, then, Nordhaus and Shel-
lenberger’s arguments leave us with a republic not of citizens, scien-
tists, or environmentalists, but of consultants.  In the authors’ schema 
it is only the professional message-framing class that retains access to a 
form of privileged knowledge on which to base policy appeals.  But 
what appeals should the consultants offer?  At whose behest?  With 
what values in mind?  Nordhaus and Shellenberger never address 
these questions.  As a result, the authors have told us essentially noth-
ing about whether their preferred message frames will actually sell or, 
if they do, at what cost. 
In short, what Nordhaus and Shellenberger needed, but failed, to 
do was to describe and theorize a constitution for their consultants’ 
republic — a set of structural provisions that would govern the nature 
of the products and the level of competitiveness present in a market 
for meaning creation, along with the appropriate liberties and protec-
tions that individuals might require within such an overdetermined 
and highly manipulable social imaginary.  The authors instead simply 
proclaim that “[t]he crises we face demand . . . that we dream differ-
ently” (p. 272),13 never explaining how it is we know that these “crises” 
exist, or how we can be confident that the politicians, consultants, and 
other “dream” purveyors who come to our aid will not induce a collec-
tive nightmare. 
This Review proceeds in four Parts.  Part I provides a fuller rendi-
tion of Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s critique, along with the authors’ 
proposed alternative to conventional environmentalism, which they 
dub the “politics of possibility” (p. 15).  Part II demonstrates that 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger, by relying on a monolithic and unsup-
portable depiction of the environmental movement, have failed to fol-
low their own advice of “[p]luralizing singular categories [as] a simple 
way to free ourselves from essentialism” (p. 239); as a consequence, 
they overlook the diversity that exists within the environmental 
movement and that, to a large extent, anticipates the themes they 
claim to be introducing.  Part III argues that the authors’ Rorty-
inspired romantic irony ultimately provides little to respond to the cri-
sis of meaning they have asserted, most notably because their concep-
tion fails to consider which actors will be ironizing, to which audi-
ences, and with what values and purposes in mind.  Part IV takes a 
more constructive turn, situating Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s ac-
count within the legal and political theory literatures from which they 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See also Werbach, supra note 6 (arguing that “saving ourselves depends not on our ability to 
shock but rather to inspire”). 
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have sampled and suggesting some vital questions that a truly posten-
vironmental politics would be required to answer in order to avert the 
nightmare of the consultants’ republic. 
I.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: A POSTMORTEM? 
Although Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s earlier missive, The Death 
of Environmentalism, spawned a great deal of online critical reaction 
and soul-searching among leaders and members of the environmental 
establishment,14 the essay actually offered little in the way of concrete 
fodder for discussion, the authors having deliberately “resisted the ex-
hortations from early reviewers of th[e] report to say more about what 
[they] think must now be done.”15  Now, three years after their “dra-
matic and petulant critique essay,”16 Nordhaus and Shellenberger de-
liver Break Through, which promises readers not simply a book-length 
rehashing of the authors’ postmortem of the environmental movement, 
but instead a revivifying journey, one that will lead, as the book’s sub-
title proclaims, “from the death of environmentalism to the politics of 
possibility.” 
Still, before the authors’ more positive vision begins to emerge in 
Break Through, Nordhaus and Shellenberger do devote a substantial 
portion of the book to recounting and expanding on their reasons for 
viewing environmentalism in America as a deceased political move-
ment: environmentalism, it turns out, killed itself.  By relying chiefly 
on “doomsday discourse” (p. 1) and the rationalist authority of science 
to rouse public concern over environmental problems, by preaching an 
unduly moralized and misanthropic narrative regarding humanity’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 For instance, Carl Pope, Executive Director of the Sierra Club, wrote that Shellenberger 
and Nordhaus’s essay, “because it is unfair, unclear and divisive, has actually muddied the water 
and made the task of figuring out a comprehensive and effective set of strategies more difficult.”  
Carl Pope, And Now for Something Completely Different: An In-Depth Response to “The Death of 
Environmentalism,” GRIST, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/01/13/pope-
reprint/.  Others complained that Shellenberger and Nordhaus’s few concrete policy proposals, 
such as their proposal for large public funding of clean energy research, “are hardly novel ideas.”  
Amanda Griscom Little, Over Our Dead Bodies: Green Leaders Say Rumors of Environmental-
ism’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, GRIST, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/ 
2005/01/13/little-responses/ (quoting Phil Clapp, President, National Environmental Trust).  Dan 
Carol, a board member of the Apollo Alliance of organizations supporting massive public invest-
ment in clean energy research, noted that Shellenberger and Nordhaus’s paper seemed to reflect 
“cyclical hand-wringing that always occurs at a time of loss, when screechy, angry complaints 
connect with disappointed people.”  Id. (quoting Dan Carol).  Activist and writer Adrienne Maree 
Brown similarly observed that “[s]tepping back and thinking about a vision for a movement is 
absolutely necessary,” but “[d]ramatizing its slow and agonizing death borders on indulgent.”  
Adrienne Maree Brown, Rainbow Warrior: Dramatizing the “Death” of Environmentalism 
Doesn’t Help Urban People of Color, or Anyone Else, GRIST, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.grist.org/ 
comments/soapbox/2005/03/15/brown/index.html. 
 15 SHELLENBERGER & NORDHAUS, supra note 6, at 7. 
 16 Plater, supra note 9, at 10. 
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causal responsibility for those problems, and by limply offering as the 
only solution to those problems various technical policy instruments 
that aim to “limit[]” or “constrain” human ambition (p. 17), the envi-
ronmental movement, at least according to Nordhaus and Shellenber-
ger, stopped connecting with the public at the level of its core values.17  
Thus, Silent Spring, which, as noted above, figures as the key moment 
of awakening in most retellings of environmentalism’s modern his-
tory,18 represents to Nordhaus and Shellenberger the most tired page 
of a very tired playbook: to wit, “wrap the latest scientific research 
about an ecological calamity in a tragic narrative that conjures nostal-
gia for Nature while prophesying ever worse disasters to come, unless 
human societies repent for their sins against Nature and work for a re-
turn to a harmonious relationship with the natural world” (p. 130). 
In Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s view, this strategy is not only po-
litically naïve, but also philosophically indefensible.  Borrowing from 
the likes of anthropologist of science Professor Bruno Latour, who fa-
mously proclaimed that “we have never been modern,”19 Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger argue that the environmentalists’ approach relies on 
a series of fundamental categorical distinctions that do not withstand 
critical scrutiny.  Most basically, environmentalism seems to depend on 
a dualistic ontology in which “humans and nature” (p. 15) are given as 
separate, distinct spheres of existence.  Accordingly, the environmental-
ists’ narrative almost always takes the form of an “[e]co-traged[y]” (p. 
130) in which the twin Enlightenment faculties of reason and empiri-
cism are used to demonstrate that a previously balanced, pristine, and 
harmonious “Nature” is being despoiled by the rapacious desires of 
“humankind[]” (p. 130).20  To Nordhaus and Shellenberger, this narra-
tive form leads inexorably to a “politics of limits” (p. 17), in which the 
choices and behaviors of individuals, acting most typically through the 
market, are said to be in need of suppression by the government in or-
der to protect the larger community of life from further human en-
croachment and taint.  Lurking within this “[e]nvironmental tale[] of 
tragedy” (p. 131), Nordhaus and Shellenberger see a series of familiar 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See also Werbach, supra note 6 (“Instead of a narrative for America, instead of a vision, we 
were preparing for maximum daily allowable loads of toxic chemicals.”). 
 18 See supra p. 2041. 
 19 BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans., 1993) 
(1991). 
 20 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the En-
vironmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 851 (2003) (urging the abandonment of “eco-pessimism”); 
Robert H. Nelson, Environmental Religion: A Theological Critique, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 51, 
62 (2004) (describing the environmental movement and its dominant strategies as “Calvinism mi-
nus God” (quoting Robert H. Nelson, Calvinism Minus God, FORBES, Oct. 5, 1998, at 143) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Stefano Nespor, Environmentalism and the Disaster Strategy, 
19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 211, 224–29 (2001) (critiquing environmentalism’s “disaster 
strategy”). 
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categorical distinctions — nature/culture, reason/romance, sci-
ence/politics, government/market, community/individual — that are 
philosophically untenable and, more significantly in their account, 
have outlived their social usefulness. 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that, in addition to espousing a 
dubious metaphysics, the environmentalists’ narrative also threatens 
“to short-circuit democratic values by establishing Nature as it is un-
derstood and interpreted by scientists as the ultimate authority that 
human societies must obey” (p. 132).  Put differently, “[l]ike the funda-
mentalist who believes his religion only can speak for God, environ-
mentalists believe that only Science, in a singular and objective way, 
can speak for Nature” (p. 141).  In the authors’ view, environmentalists 
depend on an outdated conception of science, one in which the profes-
sional orthodoxy of ecologists, oceanographers, and other natural sci-
entists is seen to embody the “Truth” about the state of the world (p. 
138), rather than merely the contingent empirical and theoretical 
claims of a particular community of experts.  In this respect, Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger join the many commentators who have contended 
that the science at the heart of environmental, health, and safety regu-
lation is always “non-normal science,”21 even “trans-science.”22  It con-
cerns matters and controversies that may be framed within the dis-
course of science — for example, as revolving around empirical 
questions concerning the scope and magnitude of an environmental, 
health, or safety risk — but that cannot be resolved within that 
framework, given their dependency on questions concerning model se-
lection, uncertainty adjustment, risk preference, and other matters that 
are not strictly technical in nature.  Moreover, scientific outputs are 
not merely a function of the rigor and intelligence of scientific investi-
gators; they are also deeply affected by myriad sociopolitical variables, 
such as research funding priorities and intellectual property rules,23 by 
sociological aspects of science as a profession, such as university tenure 
standards and journal selection criteria, and by more cognitive and 
emotive factors, such as researchers’ self-perception of ranking within 
a social hierarchy or their belief in the inherently progressive tenden-
cies of history.24  In short, the empirical and theoretical claims of scien-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23–34 (3d ed. 
1996) (explaining that normal science focuses attention on a small range of esoteric problems and 
allows for investigation of some part of nature in depth and detail). 
 22 See Alvin Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972). 
 23 Increasingly, for instance, researchers are affected by overt political attempts to control the 
content and the cultural reception of scientific investigations.  See Holly Doremus, Science Plays 
Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 249 
(2005). 
 24 See, e.g., Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The ‘White Male’ 
Effect, 2 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159 (2000) (describing cognitive heuristics and other influences 
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tists are unavoidably contingent, both because the scientific commu-
nity subjects its knowledge to constant revision and occasional whole-
sale abandonment, and because the community itself is a constructed 
enterprise subject to social, political, and cultural influence. 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger contend that this post-positivist view 
of science, once the controversial position of members of science and 
technology studies departments, is now predominant everywhere save 
for the executive offices of mainstream environmental organizations, 
where environmental leaders hold onto the “antiquated view that there 
are facts separate from values and interpretations” (pp. 141–42).  Be-
cause of this scientific dogmatism, the authors claim, environmentalists 
seriously hamstring themselves in the competition for public mind-
share, restricting their discourse to a kind of policy literalism that fails 
to connect with the romantic dimensions of culture and politics.25  
What, after all, is the sense in feeling guilty about humanity’s impact 
on the environment if we no longer believe that the latter exists outside 
of our sphere of impact?  Environmentalists try mightily to develop 
scientific measures of the size of humanity’s “ecological footprint” — 
such as the share of the planet’s photosynthetic product that is di-
verted to human use26 — as if the shock of these figures alone will 
prompt us to squeeze into smaller shoes.  As Nordhaus and Shellen-
berger argue, however, we might just as easily regard the figures as a 
fitting occasion to declare, once and for all, the whole planet ours, 
without guilt or embarrassment, and simply trust in our ability to 
manage it: “We are as gods and might as well get good at it” (p. 271).27 
A related consequence of environmentalists’ scientific dogmatism, 
in Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s view, is that members of the move-
ment tend to misunderstand the reasons for their 1970s-era successes.  
As evidenced by their continuing reliance on the strategy of policy lit-
eralism, “environmentalists [have] convinced themselves that it was 
their representation of Truth through Science that was responsible for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
on risk perception that render it culturally inflected, even among experts); Dan M. Kahan et al., 
Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007) (same). 
 25 To demonstrate these failings, Nordhaus and Shellenberger smartly contrast Tony Blair’s 
2005 World Economic Forum speech at Davos on climate change, which proved highly ineffec-
tual, with Winston Churchill’s “United States of Europe” speech, which helped to precipitate the 
Marshall Plan and the restoration of Europe (pp. 262–69).  While Blair focused darkly on threats, 
calamities, and the pressing need for limits, Churchill offered a stirring clarion call for renewed 
greatness.  As Nordhaus and Shellenberger observe, “[t]hankfully for history, Churchill didn’t see 
the postwar rubble of Europe as a laundry list of problems to be solved by technical solutions” (p. 
266). 
 26 See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 724–25 (2003) 
(describing ecological footprint studies). 
 27 The authors quote John Tierney, An Early Environmentalist Embraces ‘New Heresies’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007 (quoting Stewart Brand).   
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antipollution and conservation laws” (p. 138).  To Nordhaus and Shel-
lenberger, this self-congratulatory account is simply “a faith — a scien-
tism, not a science — one that overlooks the specific historical and so-
cial conditions that gave rise to the ecological values” (pp. 138–39).  
Rather than being a simple case of scientific fact and human reason 
prevailing over the passions of an ugly culture, the emergence of mod-
ern federal environmental law instead depended on a slew of contin-
gent historical conditions.  Most importantly, economic growth, social 
and political stability, and the creation of a robust middle class in 
America after World War II created the basis for widespread expres-
sion of “postmaterialist desires” (p. 164).  Riffing loosely on Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs, Nordhaus and Shellenberger contend that envi-
ronmental values and other such “higher” sentiments only emerge 
when individuals and families feel comfortable, not merely in terms of 
affluence and material goods, but also in terms of equality, progress, 
and social stability.  Absent these crucial social and economic condi-
tions, Nordhaus and Shellenberger believe the popular response to Si-
lent Spring would have been, well, silent. 
With vague gestures, Nordhaus and Shellenberger adapt this ac-
count to the consumerist cornucopia of late capitalism, arguing that 
individuals in the United States are now reasserting the survival val-
ues of distrust, selfishness, and materialism that had largely been left 
behind during the 1960s and early 1970s.  Interestingly, Americans are 
reasserting “‘Darwinist and exclusion values’ of acceptance of vio-
lence, just deserts, ecological fatalism, sexism, . . . and xenophobia” (p. 
169),28 despite a significant increase in absolute material standards of 
living.  As economists such as Professors Thorstein Veblen,29 Robert 
Frank,30 and Juliet Schor31 have argued, many individuals in consum-
erist societies seem compelled to rely on greater and greater levels of 
expenditure and debt in order to maintain their relative social status.  
Consumption thus becomes, at least in many contexts and for many 
goods, a positional game, such that the steady increase of wealth ine-
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 28 The authors quote MICHAEL ADAMS, AMERICAN BACKLASH 34 (2005).    
 29 See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 29–30 (Penguin 
Books 1979) (1899).  For additional variations on Professor Veblen’s themes, see JAMES S. DUE-
SENBERRY, INCOME, SAVING AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 28–32 (1949); 
FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 6, 102–07 (2d ed. 1999); H. Leibenstein, Band-
wagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 190–
99 (1950).  For a review of “thicker” sociological and cultural studies accounts of similar phenom-
ena, see Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of Consumer 
Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853 (2002) (book review). 
 30 See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER (1999); Robert H. Frank, The Demand for Un-
observable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 101 (1985). 
 31 See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHIFTING, 
AND THE NEW CONSUMER (1998); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE 
UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1992). 
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quality in America over the last three decades may have left people 
feeling more status insecure, even as their absolute material position 
has improved, a phenomenon that Nordhaus and Shellenberger term 
“insecure affluence” (p. 14).  The authors believe that, under such con-
ditions, the “[m]aterialist liberalism” of the New Deal and the postwar 
period is simply an outmoded language (p. 171).  It provides, for in-
stance, “no framework for understanding or addressing problems like 
obesity” (p. 171), since it can only implore citizens to abandon the pre-
vailing individualistic, consumerist, and transactional mindset, rather 
than appeal to them from within that mindset (p. 176).  Likewise, the 
standard environmentalists’ narrative seems tailor-made to alienate lis-
teners under circumstances of insecure affluence, since it basically 
commands them to want less and to think harder, lest they destroy the 
natural world.  Nordhaus and Shellenberger believe that environmen-
talists and other liberals talk down to ordinary Americans through 
such commands, rather than inviting them to climb up, a not-so-subtle 
elitism that Nordhaus and Shellenberger entertainingly demonstrate by 
skewering Thomas Frank’s book, What’s the Matter with Kansas? (pp. 
157–60). 
At this point, Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s alternative to what 
they regard as mainstream environmentalism begins to take shape.  
For Nordhaus and Shellenberger, “postenvironmental” politics will be 
“anthrophilic” (pp. 160, 153) rather than biophilic, emphasizing at its 
core the potential for human belief and technological ingenuity to 
unleash a new era of flourishing.  The most critical political assets in 
this new era will not be reason and fact, but creativity and optimism, 
for those attributes will, by necessity, guide decisionmaking once the 
categories of nature and market have been thoroughly deconstructed.  
Therefore, rather than lament the loss of an unblemished environment 
that never was, Nordhaus and Shellenberger urge environmentalists to 
embrace “the end of nature”32 with confidence and zeal: “Once we 
abandon the belief that there exists a nature or a market separate from 
humans, we can start to think about creating natures and markets to 
serve the kind of world we want and the kind of species we want to 
become” (p. 235). 
The authors’ own vision of “the kind of world we want” is built on 
a heavily Nietzschean account of the heroic potential of the human in-
dividual, dressed up with a somewhat incongruous social democratic 
spin.  Nordhaus and Shellenberger urge a “new social contract” (p. 15) 
that would provide healthcare (pp. 177–78), childcare, social security 
(p. 175), and other essential bases for a stable quality of life (p. 171).  
This social democratic state they urge, not for the traditional liberal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See generally BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989). 
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reasons of egalitarianism and social justice, but because the authors 
believe that individuals are only able to realize their better selves — 
and to express such “higher” values as altruism and environmentalism 
— after they have attained the level of material and social security 
that such progressive policies would provide.  Thus, “[t]he new social 
contract must . . . provide a basis for people to seek individuation and 
self-creation” (p. 179).  As with their views on the nature of nature, 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger want to reject the idea that “humans are 
essentially anything” (p. 152), believing that the future of humanity lies 
instead in constant entrepreneurial self-invention.  They see such he-
roic individualism today in Arcata architects, Burlington telecommut-
ers, Chattanooga sous chefs, and other individuals who already express 
a “more flexible and more creative relationship to work, employment, 
and one’s identity as a laborer” (p. 247). 
These individuals attract Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s admiration 
because the individuals “aspire as much to uncommon greatness as 
they do to the common good” (p. 179).  They do not, for instance, risk 
environmental hypocrisy out of rigid attachment to place, in the man-
ner of the well-heeled liberals in Nantucket Sound who have opposed 
the Cape Wind renewable energy project (pp. 89–90).  They are in-
stead members of an emerging “postmaterial” society (p. 160), one 
characterized by “communities of unique, self-creating, highly autono-
mous individuals” (p. 214).  Rather than being fitted within rigid, hier-
archical social institutions, these “self-creators” are constantly “becom-
ing” (p. 214), dropping in to and out of prayer groups, hiking clubs, 
and social-networking websites with far greater flexibility and open-
ness than witnessed in traditional, brick-and-mortar (let alone clap-
board) communities.  Thus, to thicken commitment to environmental-
ism, and to inspire environmentalists to move from merely “giving 
money and buying green products” to actually “manifest[ing] their en-
vironmental identities or . . . recruit[ing] others to join them” (p. 203), 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger propose the creation of social networks 
that resist the dichotomy between individual and community, such 
that the centrality of the self is neither unwisely attacked nor unduly 
reified by the political program.  Much as in the evangelical Christian 
movement, which the authors describe as perhaps the most powerful 
sociopolitical movement to emerge in the last two decades, this “web of 
new pre-political associations” (p. 205) would bring individuals to-
gether by appealing to their practical needs and their desire for social 
ties, rather than directly (and superficially) to their environmental  
politics. 
In addition to this soft-sell environmental proselytizing, Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger want to put a more feel-good spin on environmental 
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policies themselves.  From Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s vantage 
point, the conceptual bias long expressed in Western thought of man-
kind’s predominance over nature33 is simply reversed by mainstream 
environmentalists, such that “humans are still separate from but sub-
ordinate to Nature” (p. 135).  Nordhaus and Shellenberger instead 
would have environmentalists abandon altogether the categories of na-
ture and humanity, along with the related idea that environmentalists 
“have arrived at their values and worldview through a rational and 
considered process” (p. 34).  Such a self-serious orientation should be 
abandoned most notably because it leads environmentalists and other 
liberals to frame their policy discourse with all the emotional allure 
and rhetorical resonance of a home appliance instruction manual.  
This is not the route to an effective environmentalism, Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger tell us, for politics is “an exercise not in speaking truth to 
power but in creating new truths in the polity” (p. 160).34 
For example, the authors would reorient environmental proposals 
around the goals of “investment and assets,” rather than “regulation 
and deficits” (p. 18), since the former resonate with individuals’ deep 
desire for progress and affirmation, while the latter suggest only dread 
and deprivation.  To Nordhaus and Shellenberger, the bold technologi-
cal optimism expressed by such commentators as Amory Lovins and 
Paul Hawken should become the primary message of the environ-
mental movement, rather than a little-heard alternative view.35  Along 
these lines, one of the few concrete policy proposals mentioned in 
Break Through — what the authors call “a new Apollo project” — de-
mands from the public “a major investment in clean-energy jobs, re-
search and development, infrastructure, and transit, with the goal of 
achieving energy independence” (p. 8).36  Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
argue that if environmentalists reframed their policy platform in this 
manner, such that they were not seen to be against emissions, but 
rather for clean energy (pp. 127–28), then their opponents would be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 For a canonical, albeit controversial, statement, see Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of 
Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203 (1967). 
 34 See also Werbach, supra note 6 (“Categories — indeed, all of language — should be evalu-
ated not for their timeless ability to represent a truth that, like the fiction of nature, is ‘out there,’ 
but rather for their ability to meet our present needs.”). 
 35 See, e.g., PAUL HAWKEN, THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE (1993); PAUL HAWKEN, 
AMORY LOVINS & L. HUNTER LOVINS, NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT  
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1999); AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A 
DURABLE PEACE (1977); Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 65, 78 (1976). 
 36 Again, this proposal does little to distinguish Nordhaus and Shellenberger from the envi-
ronmentalists and scholars they claim to be displacing.  See, e.g., D. Paul Emond, Co-Operation in 
Nature: A New Foundation for Environmental Law, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 323 (1984) (seeking 
to replace environmental law’s adversarial approach with a more cooperative approach premised 
on public investment and incentivizing of environmentally responsible development).  
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placed on the defensive, forced to account for how they could be 
against clean energy and independence from foreign oil. 
Failing to embrace such an approach is an unforgivable tactical er-
ror in the authors’ view, given that the cultural space available for 
framing and reframing policy disputes in the current era is so capa-
cious.  With respect to climate change, for instance, the authors argue 
that “[t]he relevant question is not ‘What does global warming mean?’ 
but ‘Which of global warming’s meanings should we elevate into a 
pragmatic politics?’” (pp. 221–22).  Contrary to most environmental 
organizations, which have tended to focus on abatement of greenhouse 
gas emissions rather than on adaptation to a warming world, Nord-
haus and Shellenberger argue that a policy approach focused on adap-
tation and preparedness offers a compelling, hopeful, and therefore 
marketable, vision of the future.  The vision implied by emissions 
abatement simply continues the environmentalists’ theme of long-term 
catastrophe that can only be avoided through present restriction.  Ad-
aptation, in contrast, “makes people feel more in control of their fu-
ture,” “offer[ing] immediate, perceptible impacts that can be observed 
and directly addressed in the present” (p. 222).  Conveniently for the 
authors, adaptation also does not require “radically downgrading one’s 
quality of life”; as such, it is more likely to attract popular support, 
given that individuals “are less likely to acknowledge a threat that 
makes us feel guilty than one that does not” (p. 222).  Finally, although 
mainstream environmental organizations to date have resisted an ad-
aptation-focused strategy because they believe that it would undercut 
the effort to achieve significant long-term emissions abatement,37 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger contend that adaptation actually would 
offer the thin edge of a wedge, achieving buy-in from the public on the 
significance of climate change in a manner that would enable eventual 
adoption of “wider action” (p. 224). 
In sum, for several reasons — because the movement attempts to 
mobilize public support based on culturally abandoned and philoso-
phically unsupportable categories such as nature and science, because 
the narrow and technocratic policy tools that make up the entirety of 
the movement’s positive vision for the future are incapable of captur-
ing the public’s imagination, and because the preachy narrative of sin-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 Carl Pope supports abatement for the separate reason that he believes it will activate a 
more resonant set of values than adaptation, one focused on prudence and prevention, rather than 
on risk and retaliation.  See Pope, supra note 14.  Experimental research in the somewhat analo-
gous context of tort law, however, suggests that the “hot” language of negligence analysis may be 
more resonant with lay jurors than the “cold” language of a strict liability standard, such that ju-
rors are comparatively more likely to find responsibility and impose greater damages when harm 
and care are evaluated through negligence’s overtly moralized terminology.  See Richard L. Cupp 
Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical 
Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874 (2002).  
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fulness that the movement espouses is unlikely to find reception amidst 
a populace whose affluence masks a deep and growing state of insecu-
rity — environmentalism is, to Nordhaus and Shellenberger, dead.  In 
its place, the authors offer a brand of romantic pragmatism that aims 
to turn the demise of environmentalism’s categories into a strategic 
advantage.  In the authors’ telling, this “postenvironmentalism” will 
provide an optimistic, life-affirming “politics of pragmatism,” one that 
is centered around “the liberal imagination” and a “metaphysics of be-
coming,” rather than around rational positivism and a “metaphysics of 
stasis” (p. 219).38  Having set for themselves the challenge of “dream-
ing” a new social future, Nordhaus and Shellenberger thus dream a na-
tion of yeoman windfarmers forming Toquevillian associations on 
MySpace.  Much as the rapturous prose of Romantic naturalists did 
for earlier generations of Americans,39 this utopian vision, the authors 
believe, will sell environmental policies with far greater effectiveness 
than the movement’s conventional dystopian approach. 
II.  PLURALIZING THE MOVEMENT 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s criticisms of environmentalism occa-
sionally hit their mark, most notably in their contention that the “pol-
lution paradigm” (p. 111) — in which environmentalists repeatedly put 
forth scientific evidence of harm in order to identify a pollution exter-
nality, a commons tragedy, or some other market failure that can jus-
tify their demand for corrective government regulation — has become 
a liability to the environmental movement.  Something is amiss when 
global climate change is simply forced into the familiar rubric of a 
Pigouvian externality problem, treated as a mere side effect or an an-
cillary consequence of economic activity that does not require more 
fundamental reform of the way in which we theorize environmental 
law and policy.  So long as environmentalists continue to play this 
game of spot-the-externality, they will mischaracterize the nature of an 
economic system that, rather than generating climate change as an in-
cidental side effect, depends at its very foundation on large-scale, cli-
mate-altering activities such as fossil fuel combustion and land use al-
teration.  In turn, environmentalists will reinforce the primacy of a 
policymaking framework that squarely places the burden of proof on 
them to justify any governmental policy aimed at ensuring sustainabil-
ity, rather than on the defenders of the status quo.  As Professor Her-
man Daly, a founder of the field of ecological economics, put it more 
than a decade before Nordhaus and Shellenberger, “[w]hen increas-
ingly vital facts, including the very capacity of the earth to support 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 Emphasis has been omitted. 
 39 See infra pp. 2058–59.  
  
2008] BOOK REVIEW 2057 
life, have to be treated as ‘externalities,’ then it is past time to change 
the basic framework of our thinking so that we can treat these critical 
issues internally and centrally.”40 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger also score easy points when they cri-
tique aspects of environmentalism’s dark side, such as the strong op-
position to population growth and apparent disdain for humanity that 
is shown by some environmental leaders (pp. 126–27); the related lack 
of sympathy for subsistence farmers and other individuals in condi-
tions of distress whose efforts to survive often adversely impact the 
environment (pp. 61–63); the embrace of an “[i]mmiseration theory” 
that appears almost to relish human suffering as the most reliable way 
to bring about cultural change (p. 36); the sometimes scornful dismissal 
of Middle America and its alleged “false consciousness” by authors 
such as Frank (p. 158); and the occasional aloofness of wealthy liber-
als, such as John Kerry, who apparently once emphasized the fact that 
three of his cars were hybrid electric vehicles as evidence of what he 
had done personally for the environment (p. 125).  Still, whatever the 
entertainment value derived from criticizing these attitudes and be-
liefs, the authors unfairly impute them to an entire “environmental 
movement” (p. 98), rather than to particular strands or particular pur-
veyors of environmentalism. 
The result of this clumsy personification is that environmentalism, 
in the hands of Nordhaus and Shellenberger, becomes schizophrenic.  
Apparently obsessed with the Enlightenment ideals of reason and em-
piricism — as evidenced by strong adherence to instrumentalist policy 
discourse and reliance on scientific evidence to frame environmental 
goals — environmentalists nonetheless also continue to wage their long 
battle against the centrality of the liberal individual subject — as evi-
denced by frequent elevation of aestheticism and naturalism over ra-
tionalism and technology, and by various theoretical and political ef-
forts to expand the sphere of human concern outward to encompass 
animals and other nonhuman life forms, not simply as objects of use or 
admiration by humankind, but as interest holders in their own right.  
Obviously, these latter two strands of post-Enlightenment environmen-
talism, the first associated with the Romantic tradition and the second 
with various rejections of individualism and anthropocentricism, are 
not in complete harmony with each other, let alone with the rational 
positivism that Nordhaus and Shellenberger attribute to the entire en-
vironmental movement.  The categories, instead, are plural.41 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT 45 (1996). 
 41 Indeed, some in the academy might say the categories are too plural to constitute a unified 
field, at least insofar as environmentalism has been embodied in law.  See, e.g., Richard J. Laza-
rus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA 
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The Romantic tradition of environmentalism is particularly trou-
bling for Nordhaus and Shellenberger because it makes plain that en-
vironmentalists’ use of terms like “nature” is not so naïve and essen-
tialized as the authors contend.  Instead, Romantic writers quite self-
consciously shape the natural realm to serve artistic and political pur-
poses.42  By critiquing environmentalists for their emphasis on the illu-
sory ideal of nature, separate and apart from — that is, untainted by 
— human influence, Nordhaus and Shellenberger fail to consider the 
regulative function of such a concept, irrespective of its merit as an on-
tological truth claim.  More so than the actuality of nature, as gleaned 
through the positivistic lens of Enlightenment science and empiricism, 
Romantic writers are interested in the idea of nature, as actively de-
picted, even constructed, through language, literature, and the visual 
arts.  A historically antecedent example makes this point even more 
clearly: Nordhaus and Shellenberger complain that, because “the 
meaning of the word pollution depends on the concept of nature as 
pure, harmonious, and separate from humans” (pp. 24–25), the word 
provides no analytic value, now that the nature-humanity divide has 
been thoroughly deconstructed.  However, beginning with its four-
teenth-century etymological origins, at which time it was used to indi-
cate the “ejaculation of semen without sexual intercourse,”43 the word 
pollution has always been used in a moralized sense to denote those 
activities that should be treated by a political community as defiling or 
desecrating, and hence restricted.  The word therefore does not depend 
on an outmoded nature-humanity divide; instead, it actively works to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
L. REV. 703 (2000) (studying Supreme Court voting patterns and concluding that the Justices fail 
to see environmental law as a distinct field); Peter Manus, Our Environmental Rebels: An Average 
American Law Professor’s Perspective on Environmental Advocacy, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 
515 (2006) (querying whether environmental law has any greater claim to distinctiveness as a legal 
field than does “trailer park law”); A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental 
Law?, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 217–18 (2004) (observing that “when one sums up the 
cases, statutes, and administrative regulations that make up the core of what most people consider 
environmental law, one is hard pressed to reduce them to a set of distinctive, fundamental princi-
ples, let alone rules that can be applied to a wide range of current and future issues, as one can do 
in other areas of ‘real law’” (footnotes omitted)); David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Ju-
risprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 621 (1994) (“Environmental law has no explicit unifying 
principles that could serve to organize the jumble of statutes, regulations, cases, and academic 
analyses that collectively form the academic subject of environmental law.”).  But see Jay D. Wex-
ler, The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260, 316 (2006) (raising 
doubts but concluding that “[e]nvironmental law addresses a unique set of problems and seeks to 
protect a unique set of resources, and those facts alone suffice to set the field apart as an area of 
inquiry and study”). 
 42 See LAWRENCE BUELL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGINATION: THOREAU, NATURE 
WRITING, AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1995). 
 43 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Draft Revision Mar. 2008) (defining and pro-
viding the etymology of “pollution”); see also WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 1756 (1971). 
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construct a divide between permissible and impermissible human ac-
tivities, using “natural” and “non-natural” designations more in the 
sense of Aquinas’s natural laws than Newton’s laws of nature.  Today, 
concepts such as the “environment,” “precaution,” “sustainability,” 
“ecological footprint,” “smart growth,” “community,” and “place” con-
tinue this tradition, standing in for a complex value assessment regard-
ing the pace and direction of human activity, rather than strictly for a 
claim about the actual condition of the physical world. 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger might respond that, even if this Ro-
mantic redescription of environmentalist rhetoric is accepted, it is still 
objectionable for the more prosaic reason that the rhetoric no longer 
carries persuasive force.  One way of understanding the Romantic pro-
ject is that it sought to advance a particular vision of the individual — 
as self-reliant, self-creating, and self-expressive — by appealing to in-
dividuals’ interest in communing with the natural world, far outside 
the influence of human institutions.  During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, this heroic vision readily lent itself to the 
conservationist agenda of early American environmentalists such as 
John Muir.  Today, however, the share of the physical world that might 
plausibly accept cultural encoding as “natural” or “wild” is plummet-
ing;44 meanwhile, the Romantic vision of self-creating individuals has 
been so thoroughly co-opted by the consumerist economy that it is 
hard to imagine how it ever led to Walden, rather than to Wal-Mart.  
Perhaps for these reasons, environmentalists today seem much more 
likely to appeal to individuals’ interest in avoiding harm to themselves 
or their children than in bettering themselves through appreciation, 
alongside Muir, of “how completely everything in wild nature fits into 
us, as if truly part and parent of us.”45 
Still, even if the Romantic branch of environmentalism has with-
ered, many other branches remain unexplored by Nordhaus and Shel-
lenberger.  The authors seem unaware, for instance, that at the same 
moment environmental activists and scholars were developing the 
movement’s primary science- and litigation-based policy strategy in 
the 1970s, they also were plotting far more radical inroads against lib-
eralism’s idealization of the human individual, the private sphere, and 
the nation-state, including, for instance, calls to grant legal standing to 
“forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural objects’ in the envi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 See MCKIBBEN, supra note 32; Westbrook, supra note 41, at 677 (“Technology has made 
management ubiquitous, so the law has no place for the alien nature revered by preservation-
ists.”). 
 45 Diary entry of John Muir (estimated date 1872), in JOHN OF THE MOUNTAINS: THE UN-
PUBLISHED JOURNALS OF JOHN MUIR 92, 92 (Linnie Marsh Wolfe ed., 1938). 
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ronment” via appointed guardians,46 to imbue future generations with 
similar legal status and protection,47 to interpret or amend the Consti-
tution to create an affirmative right to a healthy environment,48 to re-
vive the ancient public trust doctrine with a contemporary environ-
mental focus,49 to establish specialized environmental tribunals,50 and 
even to create a world habeas court for the environment.51  Much of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 46 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? — Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972).  Famously cited by Justice Douglas in his dissent in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), this article was among 
the first in the legal literature to explicitly suggest giving legal rights to nonhumans.  See also Cla-
rence Morris, The Rights and Duties of Beasts and Trees: A Law Teacher’s Essay for Landscape 
Architects, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 185, 191 (1964) (arguing for a perception of legal rights that 
would include a “presumption in favor of the natural”); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have 
Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1985) (advocating a “[m]oral pluralism” that supports the provision of legal rights to 
unconventional entities).  See generally RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: 
A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1989). 
 47 See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); Edith 
Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 495 (1984). 
 48 See, e.g., Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environ-
ment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (supporting right to healthy environment stemming from the inter-
action of the public trust doctrine with the Ninth Amendment); John C. Esposito, Air and Water 
Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 32, 47–48 
(1970) (promoting constitutional right, rooted in the Ninth Amendment, directly enforceable 
against private polluters); James Huffman, Energy: The Limit to Growth, 5 ENVTL. L. 1 (1974) 
(proposing amendment to curb energy consumption); Ronald E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitu-
tional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 
203 (1974) (seeking due process protection against harm caused by environmental degradation); 
Richard L. Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Government Ac-
countability, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1970) (proposing environmental amendment); Harry W. 
Pettigrew, A Constitutional Right of Freedom from Ecocide, 2 ENVTL. L. 1 (1971) (combining 
Ninth Amendment and substantive due process considerations to argue for an environmental 
right); E.F. Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E = MC2: Environment Equals Man 
Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 674 (1970) (suggesting substantive 
due process right to a healthy environment); Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environ-
ment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974) (advancing constitutional entitlement to the preservation of nature 
as a symbol of cultural traditions). 
 49 See JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN 
ACTION (1971); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Ju-
dicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Cohen, supra note 48; Ved P. Nanda & 
William K. Ris, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International Environmental 
Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291 (1976) (advocating the establishment of an international public 
trust doctrine through a multilateral convention); John S. Winder, Jr., Environmental Rights for 
the Environmental Polity, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 820 (1971). 
 50 See Scott C. Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973). 
 51 See Luis Kutner, The Control and Prevention of Transnational Pollution: A Case for World 
Habeas Ecologicus, 9 LAW. AM. 257 (1977).  For further examples of boundary-pushing proposals, 
see William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: 
The Who’s, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1999).  
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this literature traversed the very terrain that Nordhaus and Shellen-
berger now claim to be discovering.  Seminal contributions by Profes-
sors Laurence Tribe52 and Mark Sagoff,53 for instance, discuss at 
length the instability of the nature-humanity conceptual divide, the 
possibility and desirability of overcoming law’s anthropocentricism, 
and the limits of utilitarian or instrumental, as opposed to virtue-based 
or symbolic, justifications for environmental policy.  Sagoff, in particu-
lar, presages much of Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s account.  He does 
this especially in three areas: his parodic dismissal of environmental-
ists’ attempt to base their policy appeals on scientific claims regarding 
the “needs” of nature;54 his insistence that utilitarian accounts of envi-
ronmentalism’s urgency will inevitably be undermined by the avail-
ability of technological substitutes for nature and by the pliability of 
human wants in the hands of institutional want-makers;55 and, most 
significantly, his suggestion that environmentalists should mine the 
myths and metaphors of America’s cultural history in relation to the 
environment — the country’s various attempts “to locate in nature the 
symbols of national character and destiny” — in order to shore up 
public commitment to environmentalism.56  As discussed below in Part 
III,57 Tribe’s ensuing rejoinder to Sagoff also mirrors the most funda-
mental critique to be laid against Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environ-
mental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).  Tribe’s article was inspired, in part, by an essay that had 
mused: 
What’s wrong with plastic trees?  My guess is that there is very little wrong with them.  
Much more can be done with plastic trees and the like to give most people the feeling 
that they are experiencing nature.  We will have to realize that the way in which we ex-
perience nature is conditioned by our society — which more and more is seen to be re-
ceptive to responsible interventions. 
Martin H. Krieger, What’s Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 SCIENCE 446, 453 (1973) (citation 
omitted). 
 53 Sagoff, supra note 48. 
 54 Professor Sagoff writes: 
Environmentalists always assume that the interests of these objects are opposed to de-
velopment.  How do they know this?  Why wouldn’t Mineral King want to host a ski 
resort, after doing nothing for a billion years?  In another few millennia it will be back 
to original condition just the same.  The Sequoia National Forest tells the developer that 
it wants a ski lift by a certain declivity of its hills and snowiness during the winter — 
immediately obvious to the sight — and that it needs a four lane highway by the ap-
pearance of certain valley passages and obvious scenic turnouts on the mountainsides.  
The seashore, meanwhile, indicates its willingness to entertain poor people from Oak-
land by becoming covered with great quantities of sand.  Finally, it is reasonable to 
think that Old Man River might do something for a change, like make electricity, and 
not just keep on rolling along. 
Id. at 222. 
 55 See id. at 225 (“Our technology is still somewhat inadequate; nature, therefore, is not yet 
wholly obsolete.  Except for the limit of our technology, however, there is no economic or even 
utilitarian rationale available for preserving the natural environment.”). 
 56 Id. at 232; see also James Huffman, Wilderness and Freedom, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 407 (1980). 
 57 See infra p. 2072. 
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ject, namely that Sagoff overstates the marketability of “the symbolic 
network he seeks to defend,” such that “one is led to wonder not only 
about the limits of his argument but also about its dangers.”58 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger also fire carelessly with their charge of 
scientism, since environmentalist scholars and commentators have long 
critiqued the notions that science can provide an objective basis for re-
solving environmental policy issues59 and that ecology can provide a 
unitary, stable conception of “nature” to fix environmental conserva-
tion goals.60  Many in the international environmental movement em-
brace what is known as the precautionary principle out of similar con-
cern over science’s limitations as a neutral and comprehensive basis 
for fixing environmental, health, and safety regulation.61  Indeed, the 
precautionary principle can be seen as a direct response to Latour’s 
call for an abandonment of the distinctions between science, society, 
and nature.62  Rather than treat the production of knowledge as some-
thing that happens out there, the precautionary principle instead 
makes it a direct subject of regulatory concern.  By shifting the burden 
of proof onto the promoters of uncertain, but potentially harmful, ac-
tivities and technologies, the precautionary principle aims to reform 
the relationship between regulation and science in at least three sig-
nificant ways.  First, recognizing that the risk assessment process im-
plicates a host of ethical considerations — not merely in the sense of 
how to handle inevitable scientific uncertainties, but also in the more 
basic sense of how to frame what knowledge we aim to acquire — ad-
vocates of the precautionary principle promote a broadly inclusive and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 Laurence H. Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: Learn-
ing from Nature’s Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1975). 
 59 See, e.g., Donald T. Horstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 616–29 (1992); Wendy E. Wagner, The Sci-
ence Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1628–50 (1995). 
 60 See, e.g., Manus, supra note 41, at 501–03; A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm 
in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1128–
29 (1994); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
1, 4 (1996).  See generally DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).  In addition to the critique based on non-
equilibrium ecology, the “balance of nature” concept also has been critiqued for its frequent failure 
to acknowledge pre-European human impact on the North American environment.  See, e.g., 
Nelson, supra note 20, at 72–73 (observing that, through the assumption that evidence of pre–
European colonization ecological conditions represents our best understanding of nature un-
touched by humankind, “the modern environmental movement comes uncomfortably close to the 
old Puritan dismissal of the humanity of American Indians”).  See generally SHEPARD KRECH 
III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN (1999). 
 61 For discussion of the precautionary principle, its possibilities, and the critiques that have 
been levied against it, see Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportu-
nity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2006). 
 62 See LATOUR, supra note 19, at 144 (“Half of our politics is constructed in science and tech-
nology.  The other half of Nature is constructed in societies.  Let us patch the two back together, 
and the political task can begin again.”). 
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participatory process, one that seeks to democratize science and regula-
tion, rather than to delegate knowledge-shaping to technocratic elites.  
Second, despite Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s claim that environmen-
talists are unduly positivistic about science, supporters of the precau-
tionary principle deeply internalize the Kuhnian conception of science 
as an evolving set of contingent beliefs and practices; thus, their prin-
ciple aims to commence an incremental regulatory decisionmaking 
process — one that can adapt over time as information and experience 
with a particular hazard cause knowledge to accumulate, shift, and, 
occasionally, collapse.  Finally, promoters of precaution recognize that 
knowledge itself is a subject of power and influence in society; accord-
ingly, the content of scientific knowledge and the manner of its produc-
tion are made direct subjects of environmental, health, and safety 
regulation, rather than merely regarded as exogenous inputs that de-
termine the outcome of policymaking but are never affected by it.  
Shifting the burden of proof onto the promoters of new technologies 
and activities, as the precautionary principle does, serves the practical 
purpose of providing incentives for research and understanding by 
those parties who are thought to be best able to develop knowledge of 
imperfectly characterized threats. 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s failure to attend to the precaution-
ary principle — and to the sophisticated, post-positivist conception of 
science that it espouses — is symptomatic of a more general failure by 
the authors to address international and global dimensions of envi-
ronmentalism.  Although Nordhaus and Shellenberger admittedly aim 
their critique in Break Through at the environmental movement within 
the United States, their lack of attention to international environmen-
talism is still a strange omission, given that U.S. environmental or-
ganizations in recent years have directed a larger and larger share of 
their energies to activities and policies outside of the domestic con-
text.63  Importantly, much of the international agenda of environ-
mental and other civil society organizations seeks to reevaluate tradi-
tional categories — such as the Westphalian state system, the 
orthodoxy of trade liberalization, the equity-efficiency dichotomy of 
welfare economics, and the related public-private divide — in a criti-
cal spirit that Nordhaus and Shellenberger presumably would appreci-
ate.64  In broad outline, for instance, promoters of sustainable devel-
opment seek to integrate economic efficiency, distributive equity, and 
environmental sustainability as coequal concerns within a unified poli-
cymaking framework, in contrast to market liberalism’s approach of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 Cf. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 18 (2007) (“Perhaps the most stunning development in the last twenty-five years of envi-
ronmental law’s evolution has been the globalization of environmental concerns.”). 
 64 See, e.g., Nespor, supra note 20, at 224–29. 
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positioning efficiency as the preeminent policy aim while relegating the 
attainment of equity and sustainability to various ex post corrective 
devices, many of which upon scrutiny seem to stack the deck against 
those concerns.65  Thus, when Nordhaus and Shellenberger proclaim 
that “[a]ny successful effort to stabilize the climate will destroy the dis-
tinctions between environmental protection, economic development, 
and global equity” (p. 269), they fail to acknowledge that this integra-
tive vision is precisely what proponents of sustainable development 
have been attempting to accomplish for over two decades. 
A similar oversight in Break Through occurs with respect to the 
domestic environmental justice movement, which has grappled with 
the interaction of environmental hazards and economic conditions in 
pursuit of an integrated vision of social justice since its inception in the 
late 1980s.66  Significantly, the rhetoric and policy platform of the en-
vironmental justice movement has tended to rest “on ethical rather 
than technical grounds,”67 much in the manner that Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger urge for the environmental movement more generally.  
Yet, in their initial Death of Environmentalism essay, Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger made no mention of the environmental justice move-
ment, an omission that attracted widespread criticism immediately af-
ter the essay’s release.68  In Break Through, the authors respond not by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 65 Although first made internationally salient by the 1987 Brundtland Report, see WORLD 
COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987), the concept of sustainable de-
velopment is generally traced even earlier to a 1980 report issued by the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature in cooperation with the World Wildlife Fund and the United Nations 
Environment Programme, see Norman J. Vig, Introduction to THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: 
INSTITUTIONS, LAW, AND POLICY 1, 6 (Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie & Norman 
J. Vig eds., 2d ed. 2005).  For discussion of the sustainable development concept, see Douglas A. 
Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109 (2005). 
 66 See, e.g., LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRON-
MENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001); 
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POL-
ICY, AND REGULATION (2002); Sheila Foster, The Challenge of Environmental Justice, 1 RUT-
GERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 6 (2004); Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, 
the Present, and Back to the Future, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701 (2002); Richard J. Lazarus, Pur-
suing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. 
U. L. REV. 787 (1993). 
 67 Gauna, supra note 66, at 705. 
 68 As Swati Prakash wrote, “My perspective is that many people of color and indigenous peo-
ple who have been disproportionately affected by pollution, and by the exploitative relationship 
human beings have to our natural resources, learned [Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s] lessons and 
were often arguing them years ago.”  Life After “Death,” GRIST, Feb. 22, 2005, http://www.grist. 
org/comments/dispatches/2005/02/22/elp/index.html; see also MICHEL GELOBTER ET AL., THE 
SOUL OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: REDISCOVERING TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 9–10 (2005), available at http://www.rprogress.org/soul/soul.pdf; Ludovic Blain, 
Ain’t I An Environmentalist?, GRIST, May 31, 2005, http://www.grist.org/comments/soapbox/2005 
/05/31/blain-death/index.html; Vivian Chang & Manami Kano, Panel Surfing, GRIST, Mar. 3, 
2005, http://www.grist.org/comments/dispatches/2005/03/04/chang/index.html; John M. Meyer, 
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acknowledging but by castigating the environmental justice move-
ment, stating that the movement is out of touch with the communities 
it aims to represent.  Specifically, the authors argue that, by focusing 
on environmental hazards that pose “a far smaller threat than smok-
ing, alcohol, and diet” (p. 74) to members of minority communities, 
“environmental justice activists often end up focusing on concerns that 
are neither particularly significant nor particularly salient to the com-
munities in question” (p. 83).69 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s critique of the environmental justice 
movement seems odd, since the issues that they cite as being more im-
portant than environmental threats — substandard housing, meager 
job opportunities, poor health care, and failing schools — are tightly 
correlated with the same conditions of economic inequality and politi-
cal disempowerment that lie at the heart of the environmental justice 
movement’s concerns.70  As Sheila Foster observes: “From the civil 
rights movement, environmental justice activism has inherited a per-
spective that recognizes that the disproportionate distribution of envi-
ronmental hazards is not random or the result of ‘neutral’ decisions, 
but is instead a product of a larger discriminatory social struc-
ture . . . .”71  Because of this orientation, environmental justice activ-
ists pursue remedies that are not narrowly defined around pollution 
problems, but instead reflect “broader, structural reforms that will al-
leviate a variety of problems, including environmental degradation, 
which these poorer communities endure.”72  Nordhaus and Shellenber-
ger might contest whether minority neighborhoods’ disproportionate 
exposure to environmental risks, as opposed to other issues such as 
housing or healthcare, provides an effective light with which to illumi-
nate underlying conditions of injustice and to pursue visionary pro-
gressive reforms.  The authors, however, have no basis for claiming 
that “[t]he environmental justice movement ignores all of these [re-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The Afterlife of Environmentalism, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 18, 2005, available at http://www. 
prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_afterlife_of_environmentalism. 
 69 Cf. Orson Aguilar, Why I Am Not An Environmentalist, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 2005, at B9 
(“For communities like mine, environmentalism has seemed to be about preserving places most of 
us will never see.”); Prakash, Life After “Death,” supra note 68 (noting that the framing of envi-
ronmental concerns through the justice lens “resonates among many who find themselves alien-
ated by the message inadvertently sent by the environmental movement that we only matter in-
asmuch as we are the problem”). 
 70 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole & Caroline Farrell, Structural Racism, Structural Pollution and the 
Need for a New Paradigm, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 265 (2006) (exploring connection between 
zoning and housing law and racially disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards). 
 71 Foster, supra note 66, at 10. 
 72 Id. at 11. 
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lated] concerns because, like the mainstream environmental move-
ment, it sees them as separate from the environment” (p. 87).73 
At one point in Break Through, Nordhaus and Shellenberger do 
seem to recognize that their stylized personification of the environ-
mental movement sweeps too broadly.  Specifically, they note that 
some environmental justice organizations already have been working 
to improve conditions in health, housing, income, transportation, and 
other areas of significant development need for minority neighbor-
hoods, as the authors urge.  However, in a pointed effort to continue 
their Oedipal theme, Nordhaus and Shellenberger claim that these or-
ganizations are “most[ly] headed by younger leadership” (p. 88) — 
leadership that presumably has accepted the challenge of Break 
Through and embraced the authors’ postenvironmental politics. 
This attempt at recategorization seems to be Nordhaus and Shel-
lenberger’s chief response to any who would claim to be overlooked or 
mischaracterized in the authors’ construction of the environmental 
movement.  Indeed, at the outset of Break Through, the authors explic-
itly ask “those readers who do not see themselves in our descriptions 
and definitions of environmentalism [to] consider whether they them-
selves have already moved beyond environmentalism” (p. 17).  Either 
you are against us or, it seems, you are already with us.  Such a sleight 
of hand to justify slighting so many diverse strands of the environ-
mental movement might have been acceptable if Break Through had 
actually delivered on its promise to provide a novel and path-breaking 
postenvironmentalism.  Regrettably, as the next Part argues, the book 
does not so deliver. 
III.  THE POLITICS OF ALMOST-POSTMODERNISM 
Like Break Through’s claims regarding the instability of conceptual 
categories, the book’s call for greater attentiveness to affective and 
metaphorical aspects of cognition in policy formulation is also not 
original to Nordhaus and Shellenberger.  In fact, legal scholars, psy-
chologists, and other social scientists have developed a sophisticated 
and compelling account of how individuals’ perceptions of environ-
mental, health, and safety issues, among lay and expert observers 
alike, are deeply imbricated with the values and visions that comprise 
their “cultural worldviews,” rather than simply with the mechanisms 
of reason and neutral discourse that are thought to be necessary to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 73 A further oddity of Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s critique is the fact that, between the re-
lease of their initial essay and the publication of Break Through, issues of environmental justice 
and disproportionate vulnerability to hazards became unmistakably salient through the tragedy of 
Hurricane Katrina, yet that disaster is scarcely mentioned in Break Through. 
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guide public deliberation within a liberal state.74  Thus, just as Nord-
haus and Shellenberger chide the environmental movement for failing 
to frame its policy appeals in ways that connect to individuals’ values 
and hopes, legal scholars criticize the conventional account of risk 
regulation for failing to acknowledge numerous psychological findings 
suggesting that “there is no such thing as ‘real risk’ or ‘objective 
risk,’”75 at least not in the rational positivist sense of a perspective-free 
depiction of material reality.76 
Consistent with this view, psychological studies also suggest that 
individuals’ acceptance of the seriousness or credibility of a threat can 
be influenced by their perception of likely policy responses to the 
threat, including, in particular, their perception of whether a particular 
response will reinforce or undercut their cultural worldviews.  Seen in 
this light, for instance, the remarkable confluence of support that 
emerged for tradable emissions permits as an environmental policy 
tool during the late 1980s and early 1990s can be understood as a re-
sult of the amenability of tradable emissions permits to multiple cul-
tural interpretations.  Environmentalists, having gotten over their ini-
tial qualms about creating a “license to pollute,”77 and having 
recognized that conventional technology-based approaches had become 
a political dead end, perceived in tradable emissions permits a pros-
pect for additional publicly defined and enforced pollution limits.  
Across the aisle, skeptics of environmentalism became more willing to 
accept evidence regarding the need for further pollution reductions, 
once they saw at the back end of the policy cycle a “market-based” re-
sponse that would express their cultural gründnormen of individualism 
and efficiency.78  A similar tale can be told with respect to the recent 
finding that survey respondents whose cultural outlook is individualist 
or hierarchical in orientation are more willing to agree that climate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 74 See generally, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 741 (2008); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, 
Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003); Dan 
M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1071 (2006) (book review); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture 
Study: Making Sense of — and Making Progress in — the American Culture War of Fact, (Yale 
Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 154, 2007) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Second National 
Risk and Culture Study], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017189. 
 75 Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Bat-
tlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390, 392 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000). 
 76 See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1763–66 
(2003). 
 77 STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 109 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 107–17. 
 78 See John Gastil, Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Ending Polarization: The Good News 
About the Culture Wars, BOSTON REV., Mar./Apr. 2006, at 18, 19. 
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change is a serious threat if they have been primed to believe that nu-
clear power will be the policy solution, rather than antipollution regu-
lations.79  In short, individuals’ willingness to perceive a problem ap-
pears to be, at least partially, a function of how they perceive its 
solution, that is, whether the solution codes as a threat to, or a buttress 
of, their fundamental norms and values. 
When discussing the significance of such findings for law and pol-
icy, Professors Dan Kahan and Donald Braman are careful to empha-
size that “[n]othing in [their] account implies either that there is no 
empirical truth of the matter on public policy issues or that citizens 
can’t ever be expected to see it.”80  For Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 
on the other hand, there is no empirical truth of the matter, only so-
cially constructed narratives of varying degrees of persuasiveness.  Ac-
cordingly, Nordhaus and Shellenberger argue that environmentalists 
“must abandon the environmentalism that thinks of itself as represent-
ing and defending — but never imagining, constituting, or creating — 
nature” (p. 238).  Environmentalists instead must enlist the aid of 
imagination consultants (such as the authors themselves81), so that they 
can “start to think about creating natures and markets to serve the 
kind of world we want and the kind of species we want to become” (p. 
235).  As this Part argues, the fundamental problem with this position 
is that — unlike scholars such as Kahan and Braman who are careful 
to hold onto a broadly welfarist framework to guide policy analysis 
amidst culturally inflected modes of perceiving and communicating 
risk — the authors of Break Through accept no discernable policy 
foundation other than pure message massage.  As a result, Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger’s views on the role of romantic imagination within 
politics are insightful, but dangerously incomplete. 
The incompleteness of Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s account 
arises from their inability to explain why, having accepted the impor-
tance of “creating new truths” (p. 160) as part of environmental poli-
tics, any particular set of new truths should be supported or accepted.  
Throughout Break Through, Nordhaus and Shellenberger chide envi-
ronmentalists for orienting their politics around an outmoded concep-
tion of nature, yet the authors themselves repeatedly invoke various 
substitute formulations for nature — such as “ecological crises” (p. 
238), “the nonhuman world” (p. 95), and the vaguely ominous phrase, 
“what is at stake” (p. 94) — all of which seem to be equally lacking in 
foundation, equally susceptible to deconstruction, as nature.  Thus, the 
authors tell us that what we need to do in order to achieve progress on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 See Kahan et al., Second National Risk and Culture Study, supra note 74, at 4–6. 
 80 Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, supra note 74, at 151. 
 81 See infra p. 2082. 
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“global warming and the destruction of the Amazon” (p. 273) is to stop 
talking to the public as if scientists and environmentalists hold privi-
leged knowledge about the state of the environment.  Likewise, they 
tell us that “if we are to overcome ecological crises, we must no longer 
put concepts like nature or ‘the environment’ at the center of our poli-
tics” (p. 17).  But the authors’ own critique of environmentalism now 
turns against them: who is this “we” and what are these “ecological cri-
ses”?  If not because of environmentalists opining on science, if not out 
of concern for the wellbeing and sustainability of some inchoate natu-
ral world and the many life forms within it, what do we really care 
about “global warming and the destruction of the Amazon”? 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger similarly critique environmentalists 
for thinking of themselves as a distinct “special interest[]” (p. 4) and for 
failing to form creative political coalitions or reach more broadly 
across the public conscience,82 yet in Break Through’s publicity mate-
rials, the authors appear on an unequivocally environmentalist time-
line, one that includes Walden, Silent Spring, and Earth in the Bal-
ance.83  Likewise, the authors invoke Martin Luther King, Jr. (p. 1), 
John F. Kennedy (p. 2), and other liberal luminaries, even as they criti-
cize the civil rights strategies that emerged during the era of those 
icons and even as they bemoan liberals’ seemingly “inexhaustible res-
ervoir of nostalgia for the 1960s” (p. 4).  Thus, although Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger never actually identify their intended audience in Break 
Through, their strategy seems plain: they are speaking to insiders and 
believers, to the environmentalists and liberals who will continue to 
support the old policy agenda, derived through the old rational positiv-
ist methods, even though the authors’ constructive advice is to aban-
don those same methods when it comes to marketing the agenda.  Ap-
parently, then, it is only when speaking to outsiders and nonbelievers 
— to individuals who are not members of environmentalists’ “tribe”84 
— that the authors’ new imaginative politics will come to the fore.  
These shifting convictions become most evident in Nordhaus and Shel-
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 82 Again, this critique is far from original to Nordhaus and Shellenberger.  See, e.g., Drury, 
supra note 9 (arguing that the environmental movement should overcome the false dilemma of 
environmental protection versus economic competitiveness to explore overlap between the inter-
ests of the labor and environmental movements). 
 83 The timeline, prepared by Houghton Mifflin, includes not only the publication of Walden 
and Silent Spring, but also a projected future showing the impact of Break Through, which ap-
parently will prompt nearly one trillion dollars in clean energy investment from the United States 
and the G8, as well as complete cancellation of the national debt of Brazil, which in turn will en-
able protection of the majority of the remaining Amazonian rainforest. See Press Release, supra 
note 7. 
 84 See Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099 
(2003) (describing psychological and political mechanisms by which participants in environmental 
debates tend to organize into competing “tribes,” with each group claiming exclusive access to ac-
curate scientific and economic information regarding environmental policy issues). 
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lenberger’s concession that adaptation-focused climate change policies 
are intended primarily to get the public on board with climate action, 
so that more stringent policy responses eventually can become palat-
able.85  At that point, the authors’ politics of possibility seems reduced 
to an appetizer — an amuse-bouche even — designed to ease us into a 
main course of limits. 
These various tensions suggest that Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
have not transcended the Enlightenment framework as fully as they 
claim.  Undoubtedly, they do stress the idea that the framework must 
be transcended, but they seem to do so only because, whatever the 
idea’s intellectual merit, they believe it will enable more effective 
framing of policy appeals on behalf of environmental goals.  But this 
selective embrace of the malleability of meaning leads to complications 
that Nordhaus and Shellenberger have not begun to analyze.  When 
they argue, for instance, that the “logical remedy” for climate change is 
“to construct some alternative meaning for global warming, one that 
would inspire excitement, aspiration, and innovation” (p. 146), they fail 
to recognize that they no longer can account for why climate change is 
a problem at all, given their rejection of the concepts that have been 
used to reveal climate change as a matter of political urgency.     
Stripped of all posturing, then, Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s  
approach appears to be little more than rhetorical icing on what  
remains a decidedly Enlightenment cake.  The authors are almost-
postmodernists, deploying the insights of postmodernist and decon-
structionist theory only insofar as they provide effective means to 
achieve ends that remain very much determined by an Enlightenment 
framework.  Nordhaus and Shellenberger may be correct to critique 
environmentalists for being occasionally unduly “sectarian” (p. 145) 
and claiming to be entirely above politics through their invocations of 
science;86 the authors, however, offer us nothing but politics, and in 
particular, nothing but the politics of perceptual and cultural manipu-
lation.  This vacuum becomes most evident when the authors cite ap-
provingly to the unnamed senior Bush Administration official who 
was described and quoted by Ron Suskind in a much-discussed New 
York Times Magazine piece: 
The [Bush Administration] aide said that guys like me were “in what [the 
Bush Administration] call[s] the reality-based community,” which he de-
fined as people who “believe that solutions emerge from your judicious 
study of discernible reality.”  I nodded and murmured something about 
enlightenment principles and empiricism.  He cut me off.  “That’s not the 
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 85 See supra p. 2055. 
 86 See Doremus, supra note 23, at 259 (“The mix of conservation science and conservation ad-
vocacy is so pervasive that is has produced a quiet confidence within the conservation community 
that they hold the scientific high ground almost as a matter of natural law.”). 
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way the world really works anymore,” he continued.  “We’re an empire 
now, and when we act, we create our own reality.  And while you’re 
studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating 
other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will 
sort out.  We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just 
study what we do.”  (p. 241)87 
Rather than scorn the unbridled relativism and will to power of 
this unnamed official, Nordhaus and Shellenberger instead urge envi-
ronmentalists and liberals to embrace it, for they contend that the offi-
cial’s account of post-Enlightenment truthmaking is “dead on” (p. 242).  
Still, what prospects for success does the politics of possibility really 
offer environmentalists once the “reality-based world” is left behind, 
once science is reduced to slogan, fact to frame, and constitutions to 
contingencies?  What reasons do Nordhaus and Shellenberger have for 
believing that the competition for truth creation will favor environ-
mentalists?  If the relevant determinants of success in the consultants’ 
republic are marketing budget and psycholinguistic savvy, why should 
environmentalists be more successful than the beneficiaries of the 
status quo, who will likely invest mightily, and successfully, in its pres-
ervation?88  If policy goals are so amenable to cultural encoding — 
and cultural values so embedded in cognition and metaphor, rather 
than in reason and evidence — then what remains to distinguish 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s preferred policies from those that would 
promote plastic trees?89  Having rejected “limits” in favor of “possibili-
ties,” having demoted science to a form of poetry, having determined 
not to “constrain” human activity but to “unleash” it (p. 120),90 with 
what are we actually left to guide us through the coming decades of 
climate instability, resource stress, and culture-rattling technological 
advance? 
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 87 The authors quote Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 17, 2004, at 44, 
51 (quoting an unnamed senior advisor to President Bush).  
 88 See Kysar, supra note 65, at 2161–64. 
 89 For instance, Michael Griffin, who became head administrator of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration during President Bush’s second term in 2005, shares Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger’s post-positivist views on climate change, but the pliability of meaning in his hands 
leads to a dramatically different policy conclusion:  
To assume that [climate change] is a problem is to assume that the state of Earth’s cli-
mate today is the optimal climate, the best climate that we could have or ever have had 
and that we need to take steps to make sure that it doesn’t change.  First of all, I don’t 
think it’s within the power of human beings to assure that the climate does not change, 
as millions of years of history have shown.  And second of all, I guess I would ask which 
human beings — where and when — are to be accorded the privilege of deciding that 
this particular climate that we have right here today, right now is the best climate for all 
other human beings.  I think that’s a rather arrogant position for people to take. 
Morning Edition: NASA Chief Questions Urgency of Global Warming (NPR radio broadcast May 
31, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10571499. 
 90 Emphasis has been omitted. 
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Undoubtedly, environmentalists would be naïve if they believed 
that simply by marshalling scientific evidence of humanity’s detrimen-
tal impact on nature, they would persuade the former to yield to the 
needs of the latter.  Nordhaus and Shellenberger, however, are even 
more naïve to believe that inspirational speech nuggets alone can 
safely and effectively guide environmental law and policy, once the in-
tellectual basis for characterizing and communicating the significance 
of environmental issues has been left behind.  More than two decades 
before Nordhaus and Shellenberger arrived on the scene, Tribe re-
sponded to Sagoff’s quite similar invocation of Romanticism and the 
importance of cultural history, aesthetics, and symbolism in the fram-
ing of environmental law and policy by noting that Sagoff “presents at 
best an argument against blacktopping the entire country.”91  Nord-
haus and Shellenberger do not even provide this argument, for on their 
account an asphalted America could be boxed and branded no differ-
ently than Muir’s Yosemite. 
As Pierre Schlag has noted, deconstruction cannot be selectively 
deployed; it “must start everywhere at once.”92  Nor can it be reduced 
to a mere instrumentality, tucked alongside history, sociology, welfare 
economics, rhetoric, and other components of a pragmatic policy “tool-
box.”  Such a reduction would ensure that the instrument could be de-
ployed by any interest, for any purpose: “If traditional legal discourse 
succeeds in transforming deconstruction into just another technique, 
just another theory, just another method for making arguments, then 
deconstruction will have no particular politics — which is to say that it 
will have the conservative effect of preserving the politics of the status 
quo.”93  Nordhaus and Shellenberger do not recognize this self-
undermining aspect of their proposal.  They argue that “[w]hat’s 
needed today is a politics that seeks authority not from Nature or Sci-
ence but from a compelling vision of the future that is appropriate for 
the world we live in and the crises we face” (p. 142).  Yet they fail to 
acknowledge that our understanding of “the world we live in and the 
crises we face” has been mediated through the very concepts and cate-
gories they aim to jettison.  To embrace postmodernism and decon-
struction only in an effort to better “frame” environmentalism is to ex-
pose the movement to the superior marketing of any other psycho-
linguistic huckster.  To promote the idea that postmodernism and de-
construction legitimate a kind of sloppiness about meaning is to give in 
to, indeed to affirmatively embrace, a politics of manipulation.  Envi-
ronmentalists on Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s approach would be 
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 91 Tribe, supra note 58, at 546. 
 92 Pierre Schlag, “Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”: The Politics of Form and the Domestication of 
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1648 (1990). 
 93 Id. at 1636.  
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left not with a politics, but a pornography of possibility, in which vir-
tually any policy aim could be packaged and marketed to activate vir-
tually any cultural worldview: Clear Skies.  Healthy Forests. 
IV.  ENVIRONMENTALISM,  
THE ENLIGHTENMENT, AND THE OTHER 
Scholars in the risk regulation field have begun to pay attention to 
challenges to liberal theory like those raised by Nordhaus and Shellen-
berger’s dalliance with creative nihilism.  In a recent article, for in-
stance, Kahan observes that the culturally inflected basis of risk per-
ception — and of cognition more generally — creates a practical 
dilemma for the liberal ideal of state neutrality among competing con-
ceptions of the good; namely, “we lack the psychological capac-
ity . . . to make, interpret, and administer law without indulging sensi-
bilities pervaded by our attachments to highly contested visions of the 
good.”94  Because of the inevitably expansive psychological influence 
of our partisan worldviews, a phenomenon that Kahan terms “cogni-
tive illiberalism,” efforts to locate completely neutral and secular bases 
for regulatory decisionmaking are likely to fail.  Accordingly, Kahan 
argues that political theorists and constitutional law scholars should 
abandon the liberal norm of public reason, which instructs government 
officials and citizens acting in the public sphere to offer only reasons 
and arguments that could be accepted universally, irrespective of the 
comprehensive views that particular individuals or groups might 
hold.95  As Kahan writes, “cognitive illiberalism reveals the practice of 
public reason to be a conceit — a form of false consciousness that 
compounds the impulse to enforce a moral orthodoxy by enabling its 
agents to deny (to themselves even more than to others) that this is ex-
actly what they are doing.”96  In place of the public reason doctrine, 
Kahan therefore argues for a practice of “expressive overdetermina-
tion,” in which laws and policies would be self-consciously constructed 
to admit of multiple cultural interpretations.97  Given both a plurality 
of worldviews in liberal society and the seeming impossibility of clean-
sing public discourse of the cognitive effects of those worldviews, the 
only available alternative for liberal theorists, in Kahan’s view, is to 
promote the suffusion of law and policy with as many cultural mean-
ings as practicable, thereby expanding the degrees of freedom available 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116–17 (2007). 
 95 Id. at 143–45 (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 175, 217–19 (1993)). 
 96 Id. at 118. 
 97 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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to policymakers as they seek overlapping consensus on issues of social 
choice.98 
This approach of letting a thousand worldviews bloom bears some 
resemblance to the romantic pragmatism of Rorty, which itself pro-
vides the inspiration for Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s argument in 
Break Through.  Urging the need for a new vocabulary that “revolves 
around notions of metaphor and self-creation rather than around no-
tions of truth, rationality, and moral obligation,”99 Rorty contends that 
liberalism should be reimagined as “the hope that culture as a whole 
can be ‘poeticized’ rather than as the Enlightenment hope that it can 
be ‘rationalized’ or ‘scientized.’”100  Just as Rorty wants to “poeticize” 
the culture, and just as Nordhaus and Shellenberger want to “creat[e] 
new truths in the polity” (p. 160), Kahan wants to promote an ethos of 
“expressive overdetermination.”  To be sure, Kahan never quite joins 
Rorty’s assertion that “every specific theoretic view [should] be seen as 
one more vocabulary, one more description, one more way of speak-
ing.”101  He instead retains the primacy of a liberal welfarist frame-
work in which “[r]easonable persons of all cultural persuasions would 
desire that they be able to converge, notwithstanding their cultural dif-
ferences, on the best empirical knowledge available on how to use law 
to promote their safety, health, and economic well-being.”102  From 
this perspective, a central objective of academic research and policy 
analysis becomes the development of risk communication strategies 
that affirm individuals’ cultural worldviews and that thereby enable 
better, less polarized public evaluation of what Kahan elsewhere refers 
to as “scientifically sound information.”103 
Significantly, this restabilizing move by Kahan is not available to 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger, since those authors argue that any body 
of theoretical and empirical knowledge — whether of toxicology, at-
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 98 Cf. MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND 
POLITICS 201 (1998) (urging an approach of “comprehensive pluralism” that “requires the legal 
interpreter to be guided by second-order norms while urging those who submit claims calling for 
legal interpretation to remain as true to the first-order norms to which they are committed as is 
possible consistent with genuine acceptance of the dictates of legitimate judicial adjudication”). 
 99 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 44 (1989). 
 100 Id. at 53. 
 101 Id. at 57.   
 102 Kahan, supra note 94, at 152; see also Kahan et al., Second National Risk and Culture 
Study, supra note 74, at 16 (asserting that most Americans would, if stripped of the cognitive in-
fluence of cultural worldviews, converge to support policies that “secure society’s collective well-
being,” and urging scholars to “identify[] deliberative process[es] that make it possible to fashion 
regulatory policies that are both consistent with sound scientific data and congenial to persons of 
diverse cultural outlooks”). 
 103 Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, supra note 74, at 23 (“The pros-
pects for making members of the public receptive to sound empirical information . . . depend[] on 
whether scientifically sound information can be made to bear a social meaning that fits citizens’ 
cultural values.”). 
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mospheric science, welfare economics, or cognitive and social psychol-
ogy itself — is merely a contingent language practice, in Rorty’s strong 
ironist sense.  Consequently, Nordhaus and Shellenberger are forced to 
agree with Rorty’s assertion that “[a] liberal society is one which is 
content to call ‘true’ (or ‘right’ or ‘just’) whatever the outcome of un-
distorted communication happens to be, whatever view wins in a free 
and open encounter.”104  Something about this position is deeply unset-
tling, both because the notion of neutral competition in the market for 
mindshare itself begs to be deconstructed, and because the unabashed 
relativism of the position seems to leave us too far at sea.  As Professor 
David Kennedy has noted, even the most ardent postmodernist tends 
to recoil at the prospect of law so thoroughly trashed: “It is all right to 
postmodernize other areas or culture zones, but law is too associated 
with power or authority, or order, or whatever to feel comfortable once 
modernity is left behind. . . . [Law] must know which side is just, in its 
aspiration, if not its reality.”105  Perhaps for this reason, Rorty retreats 
to the familiar “institutions of bourgeois liberal society,” contending 
that we achieve our best version of the truth “when the press, the judi-
ciary, the elections, and the universities are free, social mobility is fre-
quent and rapid, literacy is universal, higher education is common, 
and peace and wealth have made possible the leisure necessary to lis-
ten to lots of different people and think about what they say.”106 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger, for their part, do not broach these 
subjects at all, apparently confident that their language practices will 
simply prevail in the competition to capture the social imaginary, irre-
spective of the market within which such competition unfolds.  As ar-
gued in Part III, however, Nordhaus and Shellenberger offer little rea-
son to actually expect this outcome.  Instead, the process that Professor 
Jürgen Habermas calls the “colonization of the lifeworld”107 — that is, 
the steady redefinition of culture, sociality, and identity within the in-
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 104 RORTY, supra note 99, at 67; see also id. at 68 (describing a view of “truth as what comes to 
be believed in the course of free and open encounters”). 
 105 David Kennedy, Some Comments on Law and Postmodernism: A Symposium Response to 
Professor Jennifer Wicke, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 481 (1991). 
 106 RORTY, supra note 99, at 84.  Given the overall thrust of his ironist philosophy, Rorty’s em-
brace of liberalism in this manner appears to rest primarily on historical accident and private 
whim, much as Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s embrace of environmentalism seems to lack a clear 
foundation from within their own espoused philosophy.  Indeed, despite its postmodernist trap-
pings, Rorty’s approach seems oddly simpatico with Jürgen Habermas’s effort to resuscitate the 
Enlightenment political project through identification of an “ideal speech situation,” in which in-
dividuals can engage in an undominated discourse, free of power relations, ideology, and mis-
recognition.  See 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Tho-
mas McCarthy trans., 1984); Jürgen Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 
13 INQUIRY 360 (1970).  The difference is that Rorty also denies that such an ideal speech situa-
tion can exist.  See RORTY, supra note 99, at 60–69. 
 107 See 2 HABERMAS, supra note 106, at 391–96. 
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strumentalist language of economy, technology, and administration — 
seems likely to continue with abandon, despite the best efforts of envi-
ronmentalists and their consultants.  Especially as once-stable catego-
ries become radically unmoored, and especially if we come to agree 
with Rorty that “anything can be made to look good or bad by being 
redescribed,”108 the various meanings associated with environmental-
ism will face stiff competition from those that further consumer cul-
ture, corporate capitalism, and bureaucratized politics (and, indeed, 
the former may be skillfully deployed in service of the latter).  Thus, if 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger really desire a postenvironmental politics, 
in which environmental values become so widespread and so deeply 
integrated within our culture and our legal system that both environ-
mentalism and environmental law as such can safely be left behind, 
then the authors must confront head-on the structural conditions  
supporting contrary trends.  They must become political theorists  
and constitutional scholars, not merely psycholinguists and cultural 
pundits. 
Even then, Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s task would not be com-
plete; that is, even assuming that something like a Habermasian dis-
course utopia could be achieved — thereby making democracy safe for 
postmodern conversation — the challenge facing environmentalists is 
greater still, for they seek to make democracy safe not only for pres-
ently living citizens, but also for members of other nations, other gen-
erations, and other species.109  They desire “free and open” encounter 
not only across inevitably contingent and contested language practices, 
but also across boundaries of geography, temporality, and speciation 
that separate us from countless others whose existence and well-being 
depend critically on our decisionmaking,110 despite the real and imag-
ined distances between us.  In order to respect those who dwell in 
these removes, environmentalists contend that we must undertake an 
engaged effort to anticipate and consider the details of their plight and 
to support the specific resources and institutions they need in order to 
endure it. 
This task environmentalists regard as a theoretical and political 
challenge of the highest order.  It will require, for instance, the relin-
quishment of our comfortable habit of existing as “two people — with 
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 108 RORTY, supra note 99, at 73. 
 109 See Tarlock, supra note 41, at 235 (observing that environmental law “seeks to protect two 
communities, natural systems and future generations, that have traditionally lacked a legal  
personality”). 
 110 And vice versa.  See Douglas A. Kysar & Ya-Wei Li, Regulating from Nowhere: Domestic 
Environmental Law and the Nation-State Subject, in 2 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON 
THE UNITED STATES (Beverly Crawford, Michelle Bertho & Ed Fogarty eds., forthcoming 2008) 
(reviewing evidence of detrimental impacts of foreign activities on domestic United States air 
quality and species preservation goals). 
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one set of moral judgments and social aspirations and legal expecta-
tions within our own national society, and another set . . . for every-
thing that happens beyond the frontiers of our national society.”111  It 
also will require development of an ethic of care for members of future 
generations, individuals whose self-expressed needs and interests are 
definitionally unknowable and thus who cannot, even in principle, 
meet the standard of communicative autonomy demanded by modern 
liberal theory.  The normative challenges posed by these two endeav-
ors, already humbling, will become even more fraught as we begin to 
seriously consider the status of animals and other nonhuman forms of 
life — for which we have even less innate affinity to guide us — and 
potential forms of life such as radically engineered persons, over which 
our powers of design and control will stress our ethical resources to an 
almost unfathomable degree.  Along with a deepening of our moral 
thinking regarding such dilemmas, environmentalists contend that we 
will need to develop concrete mechanisms for bringing into view the 
needs and interests of foreign citizens, future generations, and nonhu-
man life forms.  In an ideal discourse community that extends across 
space and time, these entities would themselves be present, not merely 
represented.  Their faces would be visible, and their needs unmistak-
able.112  In the absence of such an idealized situation, scholars have 
proposed various practical methods of expanding environmental im-
pact assessment and natural resource planning in order to begin a 
process of recognition of environmental law’s others.113  The hope is 
that those would-be interest holders will be better recognized as such, 
and might eventually join the political community as full members, if 
the community were required to assess its biological inventory and 
natural resources, to monitor the deleterious impacts of its activities on 
life forms outside its territorial borders, to project its future population 
and the state of the environment, and to consider thoughtfully its en-
gineered life forms and the quality of their existence. 
As numerous scholars have recognized, expanding the sphere of in-
terest holders to encompass foreign citizens, future generations, and 
nonhuman life forms will require significant adjustment to the existing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 111 PHILIP ALLOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE WORLD 16 (1989). 
 112 For instance, the written version of the Iroquois Nations Constitution contains a much-
storied injunction to decision makers to “listen for the welfare of the whole people,” including 
“those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground — the unborn of the future Nation.”  
IROQUOIS NATIONS CONST., Tree of the Long Leaves § LI, reprinted in ARTHUR C. PARKER, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIVE NATIONS 38–39 (Iroqrafts Ltd. 1991) (1916).  
 113 See, e.g., Alyson C. Flournoy et al., Harnessing the Power of Information To Protect Our 
Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (proposing a National En-
vironmental Legacy Act that would require substantive consideration of the needs and interests of 
future generations). 
  
2078 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:2041  
foundation of our laws — and to the individualistic, anthropocentric, 
rationalist, and utilitarian basis upon which our ordering strongly de-
pends.114  Many environmental law commentators seek these adjust-
ments immediately, for they see the Enlightenment ethos as an im-
pediment not only to the assertion of cosmopolitan, intergenerational, 
and interspecies justice, but also to the achievement of more immedi-
ate environmental goals.115  Accordingly, they urge environmental law 
scholars to regain the spirit of intellectual chutzpah that once led the 
field to promote legal standing for trees, constitutional guardianships 
for future generations, a world environmental habeas court, and other 
such revolutionary devices of recognition.116  Like Nordhaus and Shel-
lenberger, they also would abandon the present heavy reliance on sci-
ence, economics, and instrumental rationality that characterizes main-
stream environmental policymaking, for they believe such an approach 
forces environmentalists to couch their goals within a liberal individu-
alist framework that inevitably understates the case for sustainabil-
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 114 See, e.g., Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational 
Alternative to Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL. 
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tions of Environmentalism, 16 ENVTL. L. 775, 785–86 (1986) (arguing that environmentalism is 
inconsistent with state institutional neutrality on competing conceptions of the good); Joseph L. 
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nections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163, 192–211 (1998) (observ-
ing substantial lag between cultural and legal acceptance of post-Enlightenment theory). 
 115 See, e.g., Erin Englebrecht, Three Fallacies of the Contemporary Legal Concept of Environ-
mental Injury: An Appeal To Enhance “One-Eyed Reason” with a Normative Consciousness, 18 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2004) (criticizing individualist and anthropocentric bases of environ-
mental law); Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 120 (“Environmental ills are best understood as manifes-
tations of underlying cultural problems — problems arising out of, and easily traced back to, the 
entire Enlightenment world view with its overreliance on reason and empirical data, its dimin-
ished moral and spiritual visions, and its unquestioned acceptance of human domination.”); West-
brook, supra note 41, at 624 (“Future environmental law awaits a vision of human association 
more powerful than the doctrinaire liberal political economy that currently informs and limits 
environmental law.”). 
 116 See supra pp. 2059–60. 
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ity.117  Instead, they would restore the Romantic, even illiberal spirit 
that once animated environmentalism, before it evolved into a techni-
cally oriented advocacy movement.118 
Other commentators, however, view with skepticism the effort to 
craft a post-Enlightenment environmentalism out of the existing legal 
order, believing instead that environmentalists must continue to assert 
a science-based, anthropocentric, instrumentalist agenda.119  It may 
well be that the final goal for environmentalism is to become diffused 
within the generative grammar of society, such that sustainability sim-
ply emerges from the constitutional system as a matter of habit, rather 
than of choice or coercion.120  Presently, however, “there is no long-
standing social consensus about the central question of modern envi-
ronmentalism — the ‘correct’ human stewardship relationship to the 
natural world.”121  Nor has a viable method for constitutionalizing en-
vironmentalism been identified, given that the ultimate goals of envi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 Cf. A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law, But Not Environmental Protection, in NATURAL 
RESOURCES POLICY AND LAW 162, 167–68 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 
1993); Tarlock, supra note 41, at 241 (observing the inherent contingency of a science-based, as 
opposed to an ethically based, environmental law, given that “[a] science-based environmental law 
will inevitably lead to processes that require [a] constant production of knowledge”); Westbrook, 
supra note 41, at 711 (“To date, contemporary liberal ideology has tried to appropriate the essen-
tially religious implications of the concept of nature as either personal preference, and hence of 
highly limited importance for politics, or as objective truth, certified by the new science, and 
hence profoundly alienated from individual experience.”). 
 118 As David Westbrook writes, “[r]endering our encounter with the world humane will require 
this polity to decide on a dream of the beautiful, and the springs of that consensus lie beyond the 
liberal ken.”  Westbrook, supra note 41, at 711–12. 
 119 See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can 
Do To Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 293 (2005) (advocating continued reliance on science 
as the fundamental basis of environmental law); A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or 
Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 193, 223 (1996) (concluding that environmental law 
must remain science-based); Tarlock, supra note 41, at 254 (concluding that, if environmental law 
“is to evolve into a permanent check on the full range of resource consumption decisions, it must 
be grounded in the enlightenment values of knowledge and reason”); Paul Wapner, Environmental 
Ethics and Global Governance: Engaging the International Liberal Tradition, 3 GLOBAL GOV-
ERNANCE 213, 213 (1997) (suggesting the reframing of international environmental concerns in 
the nationalist and individualist terms liberalism cognizes).  In his strong rebuttal to Nordhaus 
and Shellenberger’s original essay, Carl Pope agreed with the continued assertion of a science-
based paradigm, but largely for traditional Enlightenment reasons, rather than out of concern 
over legal barriers:  
Without being too precious, the environment is a real thing.  There is a global carbon 
cycle, human interventions are a small if meaningful part of the evolutionary process, 
homo sapiens depend upon a complex web of both geochemical and biological processes.  
Natural processes — eutrophication, competition, speciation, nutrient cycling, sequestra-
tion — continue around us according to their own dynamics.  We influence, but do not 
control, the climate.   
Pope, supra note 14. 
 120 Cf. Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295 
(2003) (advocating a “constitutive approach” to environmentalism that calls for explicitly clarify-
ing and debating the goals of environmental law). 
 121 Tarlock, supra note 41, at 223 (footnote omitted). 
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ronmentalism — those that go beyond the protection of nature merely 
for anthropocentric reasons — “do not draw upon the philosophical, 
religious, and jurisprudential bases of the constitution, all of which are 
rooted in the enhancement of human dignity.”122  Thus, in the opinion 
of these observers, environmental organizations should not abandon 
the familiar strategies that once garnered them a seat at the policymak-
ing table, however calcified and unreceptive to environmentalism the 
current political context may appear to be.123  Similarly, environmental 
scientists should not abandon their particular disciplinary methods 
simply because the problem of the “environment” is a much broader 
and more integrated problem than their methods can fully reveal.  
Nor, finally, should environmental law scholars abandon their field-
specific technical and doctrinal analyses in favor of radical constitu-
tional proposals simply because the existing legal regime is inadequate 
to ensure sustainability.  As with Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s hasty 
and undirected musings, premature advancement of an environmental 
constitutionalism, without deeper specification of what the society’s 
environmental goals and values actually are, and without adequate ex-
amination of the political terrain within which they must become es-
tablished, would risk erasure of the environmental law field and a for-
getting of its goals.  What looks like diffusion would instead be 
dissolution.124 
Without wishing to question the significance of bold theoretical en-
deavors to envision a more sustainable and ethically inclusive society, 
it is nevertheless worthwhile to note that recent events provide some 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 122 Id. at 224. 
 123 In a cautionary tale about the effort to break out of conventional special interest/party poli-
tics, Greenpeace in 2007 launched a campaign to remove Representative John Dingell of Michi-
gan from his post as chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and Representa-
tive Rick Boucher as chairman of the Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee, despite the fact that 
both Dingell and Boucher are Democrats.  See Alex Kaplun, Greenpeace Launches Effort to Oust 
Dingell, Boucher, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, June 20, 2007 (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library).  Greenpeace opposed the two congressmen based on their support for coal-to-liquids 
plants and federal preemption of state climate change laws.  The congressmen, however, seemed 
distinctly unconcerned: “Frankly, if Greenpeace campaigns against me in my re-election cam-
paign, that would make not a w[h]it of difference in terms of results,” Boucher said.  Dingell, in 
turn, was quoted as saying, “I am not concerned with threats from extremist organizations like 
Greenpeace.”  Darren Samuelsohn, Both Parties Pan Greenpeace Bid to Oust Reps. Dingell, 
Boucher, ENV’T & ENERGY NEWS PM, June 20, 2007 (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library).  In fact, the irrelevance of “extremist” groups like Greenpeace seemed to be one of the 
rare positions that could attract bipartisan support: senior Republican member of the Energy and 
Commerce Committee Joe Barton chimed in to support his Democratic peers, “It’s a sa[d] day 
when members of Congress can’t present responsible legislative proposals in draft form without 
having some of the radical fringe groups demanding their removal.”  Id. 
 124 Cf. Tarlock, supra note 41, at 230 (“Despite its success to date, it is still possible that envi-
ronmental law could suffer the fate of other lens courses [such as poverty law]: total assimilation 
and marginalization.”). 
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support for the cautionary view of those who would stay the Enlight-
enment liberal course, at least in the near term.  Between the release of 
Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s Death of Environmentalism essay and 
the publication of Break Through, a series of high-profile markers — 
including Hurricane Katrina, Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth,125 the 
Stern Review,126 the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change,127 Massachusetts v. EPA,128 and the Nobel 
Peace Prize Committee’s decision to focus on climate change for its 
2007 award129 — directed unprecedented attention to the issue of 
global warming, leading to a virtual sea change in American politics 
around the issue.  For nearly thirty years prior to those moments, an 
industry-led coalition of political forces deftly held U.S. climate change 
policy hostage by meticulously framing the issue using many of the 
techniques Nordhaus and Shellenberger now champion.130  It is hard 
to say whether Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s approach, if deployed 
with vigor and consistency by the environmental movement, would 
have turned the tide on climate change earlier.  It is worth noting, 
though, that the moments that eventually did work to overcome the 
opposition’s message framing and to shift U.S. climate politics partook 
very heavily of science, economics, litigation, and the unmistakably 
dire metaphor of Katrina — key prongs of the conventional environ-
mentalists’ approach that Nordhaus and Shellenberger deride 
throughout Break Through. 
Whatever its intrinsic merit, Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s mes-
sage already seems to have affected environmental politics, as perhaps 
best indicated by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s high-
profile speech at the Georgetown University 2007 Environmental Con-
ference.  Governor Schwarzenegger began his remarks in unmistaka-
bly postenvironmental fashion, castigating the green movement for its 
relentlessly negative issue framing: 
For too long the environmental movement has been powered by guilt. . . . 
I don’t think that any movement . . . has ever made much progress based 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 AL GORE, AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH: THE PLANETARY EMERGENCY OF GLOBAL 
WARMING AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2006). 
 126 NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
(2007). 
 127 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT RE-
PORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm. 
 128 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 129 The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007 (last 
visited May 12, 2007) (announcing Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
as co-recipients of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of “their efforts to build up and dis-
seminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the 
measures that are needed to counteract such change”). 
 130 See Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Challenging Global Warming as a Social Prob-
lem: An Analysis of the Conservative Movement’s Counter-Claims, 47 SOC. PROBS. 499 (2000).  
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on guilt.  Guilt is passive, guilt is inhibiting, and guilt is defensive. . . . 
[S]uccessful movements are built on passion, they’re not built on guilt.  
They’re built on passion, they’re built on confidence, and they’re built on 
critical mass.131 
Schwarzenegger therefore urged environmentalists to make the cause 
“much more positive [and] much more dynamic,” arguing that “[w]e 
have to make it sexy.  We have to make it attractive so that everyone 
wants to participate.”132 
No doubt political candidates, advocacy groups, and others will 
clamor to make environmentalism sexy in just this fashion, many of 
them with the aid of Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s consulting firm, 
American Environics, which is described on its website as “a vision 
and values-driven company . . . committed to bringing cutting edge so-
cial science tools to inform social change strategies with the goal of 
creating a politics that grows self-expression and fulfillment values in 
the culture.”133  Just as assuredly, however, other politicians and inter-
est groups will huddle with their own consultants, watching intently as 
metaphors and message frames are tuned for maximum cognitive and 
affective response, aiming with precision to “grow” their own set of 
values in the culture.  Through one-way glass, the history they dream 
will be sold like Sprite. 
The consultants’ republic needs a constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Ironically, most of the questions that are intentionally raised by 
Break Through are quite familiar: How should the system of environ-
mental laws grapple with the emergence of nonequilibrium ecology, 
which presents a far more dynamic and complicated object of protec-
tion than the idealized “balance of nature” that has long figured 
prominently in environmental thought?  Was the “balance of nature” 
concept already fatally flawed by its failure to acknowledge longstand-
ing and expansive human influence in the environment, even by in-
digenous populations whose relationship to nature often is taken to 
provide a model of holism and humility?  Can the myriad ways in 
which scientific knowledge is incomplete and uncertain — not to men-
tion socially situated — be made more transparent within environ-
mental lawmaking, so that unavoidable value judgments and presup-
positions are laid bare for broad engagement by lay constituencies, 
rather than cloaked within a “science charade”?  Can environmental 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 131 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Speech at Georgetown University Environmental Con-
ference (Apr. 11, 2007) (transcript available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/speech/5864). 
 132 Id. 
 133 American Environics: About Us, http://www.americanenvironics.com/about/index.shtml 
(last visited May 12, 2008). 
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law be better fused with economic policy to serve the needs of poor, of-
ten racially segregated communities in the United States?  Of destitute 
populations abroad?  Can the other remote beneficiaries of environ-
mental law’s protection — not only members of other nations, but also 
members of other generations and other species — be made to appear 
within the liberal democratic framework as legal subjects in them-
selves, rather than merely as objects of valuation by presently living 
national citizens?  Does environmental law even exist as a stable and 
coherent field?  If it does, should the goal of environmentalists none-
theless be to diffuse their norms and values broadly throughout the en-
tire legal system, such that the field as a separate, specialized entity 
eventually disappears from view? 
In contrast to these long-discussed matters, the genuinely new ques-
tions raised by Break Through do not really concern the environment 
at all.  They concern instead the challenge of accommodating, within 
political theory and constitutional law, a far greater malleability of 
meaning than the tradition of Enlightenment liberalism has tended to 
presuppose.  The conceptual dilemmas raised by this challenge can be 
illustrated through a simple and not unduly fanciful thought experi-
ment: imagine that biotechnology develops to a point at which envi-
ronmental values — such as biophilia, altruistic regard for future gen-
erations, antimaterialism, and various other traits that Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger associate with the “higher” rungs of Maslow’s ladder — 
could be introduced in a safe and effective manner via genetic engi-
neering techniques.  Thus, rather than needing to activate individuals’ 
better selves through careful marketing of policies that create eco-
nomic prosperity and social stability, as Nordhaus and Shellenberger 
urge, we could instead directly alter their genetic makeup.  If such a 
technology develops, should environmentalists support its voluntary 
use by prospective parents?  Should they support its mandatory impo-
sition by government regulators?  On what basis can these decisions be 
made, if not with reference to some categorical distinction — such as 
the distinction between nature and humanity, things and persons, or 
allonomy and autonomy — that is placed in jeopardy by the very 
technology being decided upon? 
If they arrive, technologies such as this one will force recognition of 
the contingent nature of our categories with far greater clarity and im-
pact than the almost-postmodernism of Break Through.  In the hypo-
thetical scenario, not only the individuals who are made to be bio-
philic, but also the objects of their biophilia, the very “nature” that 
individuals are engineered to revere, will unmistakably appear as mat-
ters of choice and technological control.  Nordhaus and Shellenberger’s 
argument, somewhat inadvertently, demonstrates that our existing po-
litical theories provide few resources for understanding, let alone re-
solving, the challenges posed by such futures.  The goal is obvious 
enough, even if its actual attainment, at present, seems unimaginable: 
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between the extremes of an essentialist environmentalism that regards 
nature as sacrosanct and inviolable, and a human imperialism that re-
gards nature — even human nature — as just one more plaything, one 
more palette for human expression, there must be some intermediate 
orientation, one that acknowledges the constructedness of our catego-
ries without sliding into relativism, nihilism, or worse. 
This is the breakthrough we need. 
